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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to undertake an empirical investigation into the assertion 
that UK investors display short-term behaviour. The thesis starts by reviewing the existing 
literature which comprises a diverse set of explanations of the concept of short-termism. 
This survey results in. firstly. a more concise definition of short-termism and. secondly, 
a framework into which the various theories may be placed. The various approaches to 
short-termism are categorised into two effects: the numerator effect and the denominator 
effect. The former refers to the underestimation of future cash flows while the latter refers 
to those cases in which an excessively high discount rate is used. Both these effects result 
in the present value of a proposed project being reduced. therefore causing the project to 
be rejected when it might otherwise have been accepted. 
Although the literature covers many difTerent approaches to short-termism this 
thesis concentrates only on one aspect of short-termism. namely the denominator effect. 
Suc~ an approach is advantageous in that it allows the consideration. and possible 
elimination, of a particular type of short-termism. thus giving direction to future research. 
By decomposing the discount rate into the following components: a time value of money, 
a liquidity premium, an equity risk premium and an exchange rate risk premium it 
becomes possible to distinguish between "true" short-term ism and "general" short-termism. 
"True" short-termism refers to the existence ofa high time value of money whilst "general" 
short-termism refers to the use of a high discount rate for whatever reason. whether it be 
a high time value ofmoney.1iquidity premium or equity risk premium. 
A preliminary investigation into the existence of both types of short-termism is 
carried out by the comparison of international real rates of return and risk premia as a 
means of testing for differences in the behaviour of investors across countries. The results 
of this investigation lend little support to the assertion that UK investors are short-tennist, 
but suggest that if short-tennism is present it is in the form of "true" short-termism. 
, 
Following these results, further empirical analysis is carried out into the issue of "true" 
short-tennism. A key feature of this analysis is the relaxation of the assumption of the 
rational expectations in both the interest rate and foreign exchange market. The effect of 
this is two-fold: firstly, ex post and ex ante rates need no longer only differ by a random 
error, and secondly, a non-zero exchange rate risk premium may exist. Therefore the 
thesis also derives an ex ante interest rate series and an exchange rate volatility series using 
the methodology of Mishkin(1984a,b) and a Generalised Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity framework respectively. 
Throughout the thesis a parallel hypothesis is considered of whether a distinction 
could be drawn between investor behaviour in countries with capital market-based 
financial systems and those with bank-based financial systems. The thesis finds little 
support, given the assumptions made and dataset used, for the assertion that UK investors 
are more short-termist than elsewhere and no evidence to support a distinction between 
investor behaviour across countries. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Short-termism, an increasingly topical issue, links the financial system, financial 
behaviour and economic performance. Those who focus on short-term ism typically argue 
that myopic UK. financial markets lead to underinvestment over the longer term, 
particularly in projects such as research and development, which in turn leads to poor 
economic performance. It is the purpose of this thesis to investigate the issue of short-
termism in relation to the UK. The thesis will illustrate the diverse nature of the existing 
literature in this area with an important contribution of this work being to provide a 
categorisation of the various theories of short-termism. The aim of creating such a 
framework is to identify ways in which the issue of short-termism may be examined 
empirically. 
As the motivation for much of the concern on short-termism is the UK.'s poor 
economic performance, the starting point of this thesis is to confirm that economic 
performance in the UK has been inferior relative to its major competitors. 
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Figure 1.11 shows the percentage change in real GDP for five countries; UK, Gennany 
(BD), Japan (JP), France (FR) and the US for the period 1960 to 1996. As can be seen, 
Japan performs the best in tenns of real GDP in all decades apart from the first part of the 
1990's. In contrast the UK produces the smallest change in real GDP in all periods except 
during the 1980's. 
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A key area for concern in the UK is the low level of investment, both in physical 
and human capital. Real gross fixed capital fonnation for the five countries can be seen 
in Figure 1.2 which shows Japan perfonning the best out of the five countries over the 
periods 1960-73 and 1980-89. Apart from the early period 1960-68 and 1980-89 the UK's 
performance was much poorer than the other countries with real gross fixed capital 
formation actually being negative over the period 1990-96. Concerns have also been 
expressed about the poor productivity record of the UK. This concern is supported by the 
lFigures are taken from OECD Economic Outlook, various issues. 
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data in Table 1.1 where index numbers are used to demonstrate the superior productivity 
levels in the US, Japan~ France and W. Germany relative to the UK. 
Table 1.1: Productivity (Output per Hour worked) In Manufacturing. 
1980 1984 1986 
UK 100 100 100 
US 273 262 267 
Japan 196 177 176 
France 193 179 184 
W.Germany 225 205 178 
Source: Griffiths and Wall (1993, p19) 
Factors which have been put forward to explain the low levels of productivity in 
the UK have included not only the level of investment, but also the type of investment, 
with low levels of expenditure on long-term projects and on R&D. Research and 
Development is important to the future gro~h and competitiveness of the economy, 
however the nature ofR&D is such that it is a very uncertain investment. At the outset of 
an R&D programme managers do not know when results will be achieved, and indeed if 
they will materialise at all. Table 1.2 shows the gross expenditure on R&D as a percentage 
ofGDP in Germany, Japan and the UK. 
From the figures shown in Table 1.2 it can be seen that during the time period 
1972 -1988 the UK has spent a smaller proportion of GDP on Research and 
Development than Germany, and, although the UK figures are higher than in Japan in 
1972, 1975 and 1981, Japan has seen much faster growth in R& D expenditure. 
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Table 1.2: Gross Expenditure on R&D as a Percentage of GDP. 
Germany Japan UK 
1972 2.21 1.76 2.10 
(49.4) (26.6) (NA) 
1975 2.24 1.81 2.17 
(47.4) (27.5) (55.0) 
. 
1981 2.42 2.14 2.41 
(40.7) (24.9) (49.0) 
1985 2.71 2.62 2.31 
(36.7) (19.1) (43.4) 
1988 2.83 2.72 2.20 
(33.9) (18.1) (36.5) 
Notes: Figures in parentheses denote the percentage of gross expenditure on R&D financed by the 
government. 
Source: Eltis et al (1992, p6) 
As shown in Eltis et al (1992), further comparisons between the UK and other 
countries can be made. For example, during the period 1967 to 1983 R&D financed by 
industry increased at an annual average rate of 1 % in the UK, compared with 4% in the 
USA, over 5% in most major European countries and over 10% in Japan. Other qualitative 
differences between R&D expenditure in the UK and expenditure in Japan and Germany 
may also be identified Firstly, over recent years R&D growth in the UK has been largely 
concentrated in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries whilst real expenditure on 
R&D fell in other sectors between 1985 and 1988 (see Foley 1990b). Also, in the UK 
government financed R&D constitutes a large part of total expenditure on R&D. This is 
in contrast to Japan where there is a very low reliance on government financed R&D. 
Further, about two-thirds of this expenditure in the UK is devoted to the defence and 
aerospace industries (see Eltis et aI, 1992, p6). 
Investment and R&D can only produce economic success if the management and 
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workforce have sufficient skills to exploit these resources (see Foley, 1990a). Davies and 
• 
Caves (1987) argue that British managers do not always display such skills and are only 
marginally better qualified than the rest of the population. Not only do a lower percentage 
of 16-18 year-olds stay on in full-time education in the UK compared to Germany and 
Japan (see Eltis et aI, 1992), but also less training is provided for those who go into full-
time employment (see Foley, 1990a). 
It can be seen, therefore, that the UK has displayed an inferior performance record 
compared to other major competitors, such as Germany and Japan. According to those 
advocating the existence of short-termism (Miles 1992, Dickerson et at 1993, WiIliams 
1991, Hutton 1991), this poor performance has occurred as a result of under investment in 
the long term due to the short-sightedness on the part of investors. Lawson (1986) argued 
that the big institutional investors increasingly react to short-term pressures on investment 
performance and "are unwilling to countenance long term investment or a sufficient 
expenditure on research and development..." (cited in Foley 1990b). 
Why should UK and US investors be short-termist but not Japanese and German 
investors? The existence of short-term ism, it is often argued, arises from differences in 
financial systems with myopic investor behaviour occuring in economies with capital 
capital-market-based, as opposed to bank-based, financial systems. The UK is usually 
grouped with the US as a capital-market-based system in which the securities markets play 
a highly active role and are the major source of finance for industrial companies, whilst 
the banking sector plays a subordinant role (see Vittas, 1986 and Mayer, 1987). The 
financial markets of Germany and Japan are usually described as being bank-based with 
the banking sector playing a major role in the financing of industry whilst securities 
5 
markets are less active and well deve1oped2• The classification of France, however, is not 
as c1ear cut due to the transition of the French capital markets from bank-based in the 
1970's to capital-market based in the 1980's. The system is generally regarded as mixed 
though researchers such as Vittas (1986) group France with Germany and Japan as bank-
based whilst others, such as Mayer (1987), favour the capital-market-based group. 
Although grouped in this way, it should be noted that there are still considerable 
differences between the members within each group. In order to examine the hypothesis 
that myopic behaviour may be associated with capital-market-based countries, a sample 
of countries will be chosen to reflect this notably the UK US, Japan, Germany and France. 
The thesis begins by surveying the literature on short-termism. Given the diverse 
nature of this literature and varying explanations of the concept of short-termism the aim 
of Chapter 2 will be two-fold: firstly, to provide a more concise definition of short-
termism, and secondly, to provide a framework into which the various theories may be 
categorised. From this base a working definition will be obtained enabling empirical work 
to be undertaken. The chapter will also discuss the impact of differing financial systems 
on investment behaviour and their relevance to the short-termism debate. It should be 
noted here that due to the diverse nature of the approaches to short-termism the empirical 
investigations will necessarily only consider one aspect of short-termism. Such an 
approach is advantageous in that it allows the confirmation or elimination of the existence 
of this aspect of short-termism, thus providing scope for future research. Chapter 3 
provides a preliminary investigation into the presence of short-termism in UK capital 
markets using the rate of return to investors across a sample of countries. A key part of 
2Recent research has however questioned this classification of international financial systems. Corbett and 
Jenkinson (1997) produce data to show that only Japan is a purely bank-based system with Germany experiencing a 
large amount of internally generated finance. 
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this chapter will be the decomposition of the discount rate into its various components. 
The analysis will consider the time value of money, the liquidity premium and the equity 
risk premium received by investors in each of the countries. It will then look for any 
pattern in rates of return emerging between countries with bank-based financial systems 
and those with capital-market-based systems. In this chapter rational expectations will be 
assumed in both the interest rate and foreign exchange markets. In Chapter 4, the time 
value of money is considered further by analysing the Treasury bill rate in more detail. 
Rational expectations will no longer be assumed aIIowing an exchange rate risk premium 
to be introduced as a possible explanation for any international differences in real rates of 
return. As a result of the relaxation of the rational expectations assumption the chapter 
will also include the derivation of ex ante real interest rates and an ex ante exchange rate 
volatility variable. Finally, Chapter 5 will provide a summary and conclusion to the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2: APPROACHES TO SHORT-TERMISM 
I) INTRODUCTION 
A major problem in discussing the concept of short-termism seems to be the fact that 
there is little agreement on what short-termism actually means. Short-termism has been 
compared to monetarism in that the two concepts "have come to symbolise what is perceived 
as a multitude of sins loosely threaded together" (Ball 1991, p20). 
The aim of this chapter therefore, is to offer a survey of the literature on short-termism. 
An important role of this chapter will be to develop a concise definition of short-termism from 
the diverse set of explanations provided so far in the literature. In particular the aim will be 
to create a definition of short-termism such that an empirical investigation into its existence 
in UK capital markets may be undertaken. 
A useful starting point for analysing short-termism is the methodology by which the 
fundamental value of an asset is determined. The basic principle for estimating the 
fundamental value of an asset was developed by J B Williams (1938) in "The Theory of 
Investment Value". The proposal is that a potential investor will estimate and sum the 
expected future income stream, in the form of both dividends and capital appreciation, arising 
from the investment. In other words, the fundamental value of an asset is equal to the 
discounted present value of future cash flows. It has frequently been argued, and accepted, 
that a positive time value of money exists, i.e. people prefer to have money now rather than 
in the future, therefore these cash flows need to be expresse~ in present value terms as shown 
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in equation 2.1. 
At PV= E-
(1+7Y (2.1) 
where PV is the present value of the asset, Atis the future cash flow and r is the discount rate, 
that is, the opportunity cost of capital for equivalent income streams. 
The discounting procedure is an important one which recognises that cash flows 
occurring at different times are not directly comparable and provides a method for evaluating 
such cash flows. However, a fundamental difficulty incurred when implementing this 
procedure is the choice of discount rate. The discount rate may be seen as the return an 
investor would require to receive from an investment and it is important to consider how such 
a rate is arrived at. The discount rate, r, may be broken down into two key components: a risk-
free time value of money plus a premium for the risk associated with the project itself, hence 
(2.2) 
where rf is the risk-free rate and rp is the project risk premium. The first component, the risk-
free rate, r & is the opportunity cost of deferring liquidity until a future date, in other words, the 
investors' time value of money. The second component, the risk premium, r" is required since 
investment appraisal necessarily involves forecasting future cash flows, yet, given the 
uncertain nature ofthe world, these projections mayor may not turn out to be the same as the 
cash flows that actually arise. Keynes described this type of risk as the "involuntary 
disappointment of expectation" (1936, P 144). Therefore, the risk premium is a payment, in 
addition to the basic discount rate rf, to reward the investor for taking on the risk involved in 
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the project. 
11) APPROACHES TO SHORT-TERMISM 
The literature in the area of short-tennism provides a series of diverse explanations and 
therefore in order to summarise this literature it will be useful to categorise the various 
approaches. The categorisation to be used here will be based on the present value equation 
(equation 2.1), an approach already used by Miles (1992,1993), who divides the theories of 
short-tennism into two broad categories: 
1. theories based on an inappropriate valuation of companies by outsiders 
2. theories not based on such an inappropriate valuation. 
Theories in the first group are based on the way in which the present value is obtained 
and may. in turn, be broken down into two components: mis-calculation of expected cash 
flows, which Miles argues takes the fonn of systematic underestimation of long tenn cash 
flows; and secondly, the use of an inappropriately high discount rate given the level of risk 
involved in the project. 
The fonner, i.e. the systematic underestimation of expected cash flows, operates on 
the numerators in equation 2.1, deflating the present value and therefore causing projects to 
be rejected when they may otherwise have been accepted. The systematically high discount 
rate, on the other hand, will influence the denominator and again will cause some long-tenn 
projects, through the production of a lower present value, to be rejected when they should have 
been accepted. Miles. using a sample of 477 non-financial finns in the UK between 1980 and 
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1989, obtains estimates suggesting the discount rates applied to cash flows accruing in six 
months time would have been more appropriately applied to those accruing in eleven months 
time. Miles also estimates that cash flows accruing six months into the future were 
underestimated by 5% relative to rational expectations, whilst cash flows accruing in 5 years 
were systematically underestimated by nearly 40%. The implication is that an inaccurate 
calculation of the company's worth is made by outsiders given the information available, i.e. 
the investor uses the available information but does not assess it in a rational way. The second 
interpretation of short-termism by Miles as underestimated future cash flows presents two 
limitations: firstly, it is not made clear why outsiders should be systematically underestimating 
future cash flows, and secondly it implies that it is possible to measure both the level of risk 
to be attached to each project and what the appropriate valuation actually is. 
Although classification of the various theories is useful, Miles does not adequately 
explain what is included in each category, particularly the second i.e. theories which are not 
based on an inappropriate valuation of companies by outsiders. This category seems to draw 
together all remaining theories, but in general may be described as situations where market 
features make it difficult to arrive at an appropriate valuation. 
In order to provide a more detailed and comprehensive classification of the literature 
an approach based on the present value equation (equation 2.1) will be adopted. 
Mathematically, the valuation placed on an investment using the present value method may 
be too low due to two reasons: either the denominator is too high or the numerator is too low. 
These outcomes will be referred to as the denominator effect and numerator effect 
respectively. The numerator effect may be described as a situation in which the numerator 
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tenns (expected cash flows) are lower than would rationally be expected resulting in a lower 
present value. The denominator effect, on the other hand, refers to the undervaluation of 
present value arising due to the use of a high discount rate given the level of risk involved. 
This high discount rate may be the result of a high time value of money, as measured by the 
risk-free rate or a high risk premium. The aim of this chapter is to consider the nature of 
financial markets and examine the scope for the existence of short-termism in these markets. 
This will be carried out within the context of the present value equation, equation 2.1, in terms 
of the denominator and numerator effects described above. The existence of these effects will 
be considered with respect to equity markets, the banking sector, managers and the 
macroeconomic climate. 
i) Equity Markets 
The potential for the existence of short-termism through equity markets is of particular 
importance to countries such as the UK and US which are typically argued to place greater 
emphasis on equity as a source of finance than countries such as Germany and Japan (see 
Prevezer,1994). 
Where the functions of owner and entrepreneur are combined, the interests of both 
ownership and control coincide with the ultimate goal being the long-tenn survival of the firm. 
However, with the development of the limited liability company, there has been the separation 
of ownership and control and as a result the development of two groups, owners and 
managers, with potentially diverse interests. The concern is that, when evaluating a firm's 
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value, the focus of shareholders is on the short-term performance of the firm with emphasis 
placed on current profits and dividend payments. Meanwhile, the management needs to make 
plans which may be unlikely to reap returns for many years. 
In the discussion of financial markets agency relationships are important. The 
shareholders, who are the oWners or "principals" may be looking for high dividend payments. 
On the other hand, the manager or "agent" may have objectives such as the rate of growth of 
the firm due to their influence on remuneration, salary and job security. Therefore, problems 
were created in the capital markets which are known as principal-agent problems in today's 
terms, with shareholders being the principals and managers the agents. The problem arises 
for the shareholders of how they can constrain the behaviour of managers and how managers 
can be prevented from pursuing their own interests particularly where these conflict with the 
interests of the firm. So how does the conflict between shareholders and managers result in 
short-termism? The equity market is usually associated with short-termism under the 
following assumptions: firstly, that shareholders focus on the short-term performance of the 
company, t and secondly, that they have the ability to constrain the managers' behaviour such 
that they seek short-term gains from their investment, that is, there exists an effective market 
for corporate control. 
The first assumption associated with short-termism is that it is shareholders themselves 
who are pursuing short-term gains, but is this a valid assumption to make? The reasoning 
behind this assumption will be made in terms of asymmetric information, imperfect 
IThis focus on the short-term may be a reflection of the time value of money of shareholders themselves or 
alternatively may be the result of the way in which capital markets operate. 
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knowledge, speculative activity and the institutional investor. 
a) Asymmetric Information 
In an efficient market where infonnation can flow freely between the principal and the 
agent the shareholders would use all the infonnation available to assess the future income 
stream, to detennine a discount rate and arrive at a present value figure for their investment. 
However the more limited is the availability of infonnation, the harder it will become to reach 
the true valuation of a company's worth. One problem which may exist is that of asymmetric 
information. It is probable that the manager will have access to a greater volume of 
infonnation than the shareholder, or potential shareholder, for example on profit levels etc 
(see Foley, 1990b). Being in control of the infonnation, the manager has limited control over 
how much infonnation to divulge to the markets~ typically managers defend their decision to 
withhold infonnation on the basis that it would give an advantage to their competitors (see 
Foley, 1990b). However the shareholders/ potential investors need some infonnation on which 
to base their assessment of the finn and, as a result, the investors have to use 'signals' to make 
their investment decision, the most important of which are annual and interim results and 
dividend payments. Dividend payments can be raised by cutting investment whilst earnings 
can be increased by cutting longer tenn expenditures such as R&D. As a result of this 
emphasis on 'signals' by investors, managers are compelled to consider the short-tenn 
perfonnance of the company so that it provides attractive 'signals' to investors, that is, 
managers are forced into using a higher discount rate than they might otherwise do, i.e. a 
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denominator effect is present. 
A more specific use of the signalling type approach is the 'signal-jamming' model as 
described by Stein (1988,1989). Stein uses this model to show that even in a fully efficient 
market managers may behave myopically whenever stock prices appear in the managerial 
utility function. The stock market, it is assumed, uses current earnings as a signal of future 
earnings and hence to make a rational forecast of firm value. As a result managers will 
attempt to inflate current earnings to raise expectations of future earnings. In equilibrium, the 
market realises that earnings inflation has occurred and takes this into account when 
forecasting. The preferred co-operative equilibrium would be one in which there was no 
myopia on the part of the managers and no earnings adjustment on the part of investors. 
Unfortunately such a situation cannot be sustained as a Nash equilibrium. If the market 
conjectures zero managerial myopia, the managers will have an incentive to fool the market 
by boosting current earnings. Similarly, where the market expects all managers to behave 
myopically, if one manager does not do so then it would give the appearance of poor 
managerial performance since current earnings would be lower. 
Morris (1994) identifies three inferences which may be drawn from the signal-
jamming model. Firstly, the type of investment is important: where the investment is of a 
highly tangible nature, such as plant and machinery, the risks, payoffs etc are easier to 
determine than with intangible investment, such as R&D, where it is harder for investors to 
accurately assess cash flows. Secondly, the holding of shares by managers may worsen the 
situation by providing further disincentives for managers to undertake long-term investment. 
Finally, if managers are forced into myopic behaviour this will involve the use of excessively 
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high discount rates, therefore reducing investment below the profit-maximising optimum. If 
this is the case then an increase in investment will raise the value of the company creating a 
positive share-price response. Morris argues this should not be taken as being indicative that 
short-termism is not present. This argument helps to reconcile some of the existing evidence 
with the presence of short-term ism. For example, McConnell and Muscarella (1985) find that 
the announcement of increased investment expenditure results in a positive share-price 
reaction, a result which Jensen (1986) argues implies that stock markets are not myopic. 
However, according to the arguments presented above it can be seen that a positive stock price 
response to the announcement of increased investment expenditure can occur even in the 
presence of short-termism. 
According to Stein (1988) the extent of the difficulties occurring as a result of 
imperfect information flows will be affected by the degree of dispersion of a firm's 
shareholders. In the presence of highly dispersed shareholdings there is no incentive for each 
individual shareholder to seek out more information and, whilst theoretically the shareholders 
could seek information jointly, the impracticalities of doing so are likely to prevent this 
happening. In contrast, where shareholdings are more concentrated, large shareholders have 
a greater incentive to gain more information. The implication of this line of argument is that 
there is less pressure on firms to behave in a short-term manner where shareholders are more 
highly concentrated. 
Recognising the problems created by signalling in financial markets, Foley (l990b) 
argues that this line of reasoning depends entirely on the existence of asymmetric information 
and that it has nothing to do with short-term behaviour. This argument is supported by Nickell 
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and Wadhwani (1987) who argue that, since the share price responds to information on 
dividends or earnings, investor behaviour cannot be described as irrational. However, whether 
rational or not the low investment valuation can be argued to be due to the functioning of 
capital markets. It is arguments such as this which have led to numerous calls for improved 
information flows in capital markets (see WilIiams, 1991, Ferguson, 1989 and Foley, 1990b). 
Schleifer and Vishny (1990) also provide an explanation of how managers may 
encounter systematic pressure to act in a short-term manner in the presence of rational 
investors. Their model is based on the difference in expected arbitrage costs on long and 
short-term assets. The expected carrying cost of holding a $1 investment until any mispricing 
is eliminated or reduced is higher for long-term arbitrage than short-term arbitrage. Arbitrage 
may involve two risks: the first is fundamental risk where the fundamental value of an asset 
may fall before the mispricing is reduced or eliminated. A second type of risk is "noise trader 
risk" (Bradford De Long et aI, 1990) in which the mispricing may get worse before it is 
eliminated. These risks will be accentuated for assets where the share price correction takes 
longer, e.g. on long-term assets, since there is more time for bad news or pessimism to enter 
the market. 
Outsiders do not know whether arbitrageurs are smart or not and so restrict the supply 
of funds to the arbitrageurs. In addition to this restriction in the supply of funds, a further 
credit constraint arises with long-term arbitrage in contrast to short-term arbitrage due to the 
"opportunity cost of having one's money tied up" (ScWeifer and Vishny, 1990, p149). In order 
to persuade outsiders that he is smart and has the ability to earn abnormal returns, the 
arbitrageur will wish to perform well, both repeatedly and in the near future. This outcome 
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may be achieved by trading multiple short-term assets rather than a single long-term asset. 
The achievement of abnormal returns over the short-term becomes self-fulfilling: as short-term 
assets become more attractive trading in these assets becomes faster and less risky. The 
greater volume of trading in short-term assets will result in faster share price correction 
thereby reducing the risk to the arbitrageur. Conversely investment in long-term assets will 
become less attractive and the lower volume of trading will mean that share price correction 
will take longer. Therefore arbitrageurs will concentrate on the short-term which will in turn 
lead to short-term horizons for managers, i.e. leads to managers using a higher discount rate. 
Managerial shareholdings may make things worse with managers wishing to avoid long-term 
investment and so avoid capital losses. The short-term pressures of arbitrage mispricing may 
be alleviated by managers having majority control or sufficient insider control to render share 
price misvaluations irrelevant. 
b) Imperfect Knowledge 
Dickerson et al (1993) highlight the problems caused by the presence of imperfect 
knowledge and use as a starting point the concept that investment decisions may be seen as 
a dynamic game, in which the two key players are managers and shareholders and whose 
objectives do not necessarily coincide. Further, each group does not have perfect knowledge 
with respect to how the other will behave. The manager's primary objectives may include the 
rate of growth of the firm and job security. Rate of growth may be important since salaries 
and other forms of remuneration may be linked to the size or growth of the enterprise. The 
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size of the finn may also be important to the managers in tenns of greater market power and 
managerial prestige associated with larger finns. The first objective, growth, is assumed to be 
achieved through direct retained profits. At the same time, however, dividends have to be 
maintained to satisfy shareholders and support a strong share price, which in turn helps to 
meet the second objective, job security, by reducing the takeover threat. The managers 
therefore face a dilemma: they can either reward themselves now at the expense of current 
investment and future profits or they can invest now in anticipation of future compensation2• 
This choice is of course subject to the condition that they produce sufficient profits to satisfy 
the shareholders. The shareholders face a similar dilemma: they may seek higher dividend 
payments now at the expense of current investment or they could promote current investment 
to reap higher dividends in the future. The difficulties involved in the choices facing both 
shareholders and managers are compounded by the uncertainty surrounding the behaviour of 
the other group, i.e. each group has imperfect information on how the other group will behave. 
If the managers undertake current investment with a view to receiving benefits in the long-
term they cannot be certain the shareholders will co-operate, i.e. managers cannot be sure the 
shareholders will not require an increased share of the profits through higher dividends. 
Consequently this removes the incentive for managers to invest over the long-term. The 
shareholders face a similar problem in that, if they do opt for higher current investment, they 
cannot be certain they will receive the higher future dividends, i.e. they are unsure of how 
much of the resulting profits will be used to compensate the managers in the form of 
2This choice is further compounded by the 'signals' investment may send out to investors. For example 
where investment is invisible high investment will lead to high current costs and may be mistaken for low 
managerial effort. (See Laf'font and Tirole, 1987) 
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pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits. As a result long-term high trust relationships cannot 
be established It should be noted that the dilemma facing the manager occurs whether or not 
the share is correctly priced and thus is not necessarily a result of market inefficiency. 
Therefore the presence of imperfect knowledge results in the inability of the managers 
and shareholders to make precommitments and to form long-term contracts. As uncertainty 
increases the further into the future we look, the short-term is preferred to the long-term, 
hence resulting in a denominator effect. 
As has been seen, the manager's actual behaviour is a function of two pressures: their 
own objective of growth maximisation and the shareholder's objective of profit maximisation. 
Which of these objectives dominates will depend on the ability shareholders have to enforce 
their wishes, which, in turn, will depend on the size of individual shareholders (see Morris, 
1994). Where there is a high degree of dispersion amongst the shareholders there will be only 
a weak ability for the owners to constrain managers into behaving in theirs, the owners', 
interests. On the other hand a high level of concentration of shareholders will enable much 
more effective enforcement. Odagiri (1981) emphasises the importance of an effective 
takeover constraint. Evidence of this can be seen by comparing Japan and the US: in Japan 
higher salaries or status are rarely achieved through the labour market, i.e. by transferring from 
one job to another, and so managers look to other sources such as increased growth within a 
company. At the same time the lack of an effective takeover market makes enforcement costs 
high and so the growth objective dominates. It is perhaps paradoxical that, according to this 
theory, the high growth rates in countries such as Japan have therefore been achieved through 
the existence of weak, ineffective markets. In the US there is a flexible labour market and an 
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effective market for corporate control and consequently growth rates are much lower. 3 
c) Speculative Activity 
The problems associated with imperfect knowledge and information flows may be 
accentuated by another feature of capital markets, that of speculative activity. The concern 
about speculation is not merely a modem one, but was expressed by Keynes (1936, chapter 
12). Keynes identifies two distinct activities in financial markets: enterprise, the activity of 
forecasting the prospective yield of assets over their life and, speculation, the forecasting of 
the psychology of the market. Keynes maintained that the former, enterprise, by no means 
always dominates the latter, speculation. If a situation does develop in which speculative 
activity dominates then the market becomes based on individuals trying to determine the 
psychology of investors; i.e. rather than trying to anticipate what is going to happen in the 
borrowing sector itself, investors become involved in speculating on what they think other 
investors will be speculating. 
3 Morris (1994) highlights an important implication of the Marris-Odagiri framework. In an outside-
control setup there are two pressures on investment: managers wish to pursue growth policies whereas those 
controlling the firm pursue shorter-term objectives such as profitability. The result is that the two tend to offset 
each other therefore moving towards an optimal investment programme. 
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"Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the 
position becomes serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of 
speculation. When the capital development of a country becomes the by-product of 
the activities of a casino the job is likely to be ill-done." 
(Keynes,1936,p159) 
Therefore problems arise when speculation becomes a more prevalent feature of the 
market than enterprise. Investors are more concerned with guessing what other people will 
be guessing the market's valuation of an investment will be, rather than using the present value 
equation to arrive at a valuation of the company's worth. Such behaviour introduces more 
noise into the system, thus accentuating the problems associated with information flow, i.e. 
accentuating short-term pressures. 
Keynes' viewpoint of investment behaviour provides an interesting contrast to that 
perceived today, 
"It is rare, one is told, for an American to invest, as many Englishmen still do, 'for 
income'; and he will not readily purchase an investment except in the hope of capital 
appreciation. " 
(Keynes,1936, p159) 
In other words, Keynes' American is more concerned with a favourable change in 
valuation than on the prospective yield of the investment. 
So can the UK. financial markets be described as a casino? Are investors speculators 
without loyalty, just moving funds around in hopeful anticipation of a capital appreciation, 
with no long term interests? The extent of speculation and volatility has, along with other 
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causes, led to questions about the efficiency of financial markets, which Ball (1991) describes 
as a fundamental part of the theoretical debate on short-termism. 
Williams (1991), whilst having no argument with the working of the markets 
themselves, does question the way in which they respond to the arrival of information 
concerning the circumstances of firms in the stock market. Oxford Instruments Group plc, for 
example, in reply to a 40% drop in earnings per share in 1988, experienced a fall in their stock 
price fTomjust over 550p to almost 160p despite receiving an order for their new product. In 
contrast, those supporting free market ideas argue that financial markets are only operating 
as they should (see Marsh, 1990 and Pickens, 1986). Speculation may be argued to have a 
role to play in financial markets as it is the speculator's task to identify investments which 
have been incorrectly priced. Through their dealing activities the speculators can disseminate 
information to the market helping prices to adjust quickly to their true value. This 
improvement in information flow may help to alleviate the short-term pressures caused by 
asymmetric information and imperfect knowledge as discussed above. 
d) The Institutional Investor 
An important development in the UK during the 1980's is the rise in the relative 
importance of the institutional investor whose presence accentuates some of the problems 
already mentioned. Although having funds to be invested for long periods, institutional 
investors are apparently reluctant to encourage long term investments and programmes such 
as R&D (see Henderson,1993). They seem instead to invest for the short-term, continually 
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moving funds around to earn maximum returns. This behaviour is accentuated by the fact that 
institutional fund managers have their performance measured quarterly and their achievements 
are often presented in the form of league tables. 
"It is increasingly recognised that there is a growing rift between the city and industry, 
caused by the propensity of institutional shareholders to behave, not as proprietors, but 
merely as paper shuffiers" 
(Mclnroy, 1990, pI IS) 
Mclnroy then goes on in the same article to emphasise the damage caused by the 
managers moving funds around from one investment to the other, 
"The whole system is like employing a gardener and remunerating him according to 
the number of plants he uproots weekly and replaces with new ones." 
(McInroy, 1990, pllS) 
It has been suggested that a divergence between the company valuation of management 
and of institutional investors has arisen because of the latter's more short-term perspective (see 
Marsh, 1990). Their preoccupation with short-term profits can also affect the takeover 
market~ as holders of a block of shares, institutional investors carry considerable weight and 
can yield more influence in the takeover market. Coupled with their preoccupation with short-
term profits, this influence fuels takeover activity which can in itself create short-term 
pressures, as explained in the following section. 
Further, the institutional investor, as a holder of block voting power, may increase the 
extent of agency problems. The institutional investor acts on behalf of the individual investor 
too, but again there is no reason to expect the two groups to be pursuing the same goals. It has 
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been argued that the interests of the institutional investor and the individual investor do not 
coincide. For example, one argument is that the two groups differ in their attitudes to takeover 
(see Ball, 1991). Now three groups exist and agency relationships may arise between the 
individual investor and the institutional investor or between the institutional investor and 
management. Is this increasing the scope for divergent valuation? Concerns have been 
expressed about the functioning of the institutional sector of the market for a number of 
reasons, but particularly for the frequency with which funds are moved around from one 
company to another and the emphasis placed on the performance tables of firms operating in 
the industry. The continual focus on portfolio return optimisation encourages the fund 
managers to acquire and dispose of holdings to gain from favourable price movements and to 
mitigate against unfavourable ones, thus emphasising short-term considerations (see 
Henderson, 1993). Ball (1991) however presents evidence which does not conform with this 
view. Using figures based on average trading and portfolio activity, Ball argues that a 
'notional' share will be held on average for 10 years and that ifthere is a difference between 
turnover in the UK and that found elsewhere, it is in fact lower in the UK than in Germany and 
Japan. 
In addition, as in the case of speculation, it is possible to argue that turnover actually 
improves market efficiency. Marsh (1990) identifies two types of turnover; liquidity-
motivated turnover and information-motivated turnover. The provision of liquidity is a 
fundamental function of capital markets and a 'healthy sign of a well-functioning capital 
market' (Marsh, 1990, p35). Information-motivated turnover occurs when the investor 
identifies mis-priced shares and, where this mis-pricing is sufficiently large to cover any 
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dealing costs, initiates dealing activity in these shares. 
11 In itself, therefore, turnover is not detrimental to market efficiency, but is instead a 
very important part of the mechanism for keeping markets efficient." 
(Marsh, 1990, p36) 
Marsh advocates the view that the dealings of fund managers in general form an 
important mechanism which helps to keep the market efficient. 
e) Corporate Control 
The role of the market for corporate control in the issue of short-term ism comprises 
two aspects: firstly, the existence of extensive takeover activity can in itself create short-
termism by making the establishment of long-term relationships difficult, thus accentuating 
the problems in this area created by asymmetric information and imperfect knowledge. 
Secondly, the takeover market is important to the short-termism debate due to its role as a 
means of constraining managers to behave in shareholders interests which, as has been seen, 
may involve short-term pressures. 
As previously discussed, a short-term perspective may arise out of imperfect 
knowledge on the part of both investors and managers with respect to the future behaviour of 
other groups within the firm. Dickerson et al (1993) point to the co-existence of principal-
agent problems and the market for corporate control as a contributor to the presence of short-
termist behaviour in the UK. They argue that the market for corporate control, or more 
specifically, an active takeover market can reduce the incentive for investors to create long-
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term relationships by increasing the probability that these relationships will be broken in the 
future. In the event that these relationships do break down, they argue there is evidence to 
suggest that renegotiation of new contracts becomes even less efficient due to the breach of 
trust. Mayer (1993) cited in Dickerson et al (1993, p3) suggests that the problem arises 
principally from the control of ownership. Mayer argues that disparate forms of ownership 
in capital-market-based financial systems lead to an inability to make precommitments and 
this may have an adverse impact on the investment strategy of the firm. 
So far the link between the choice of discount rate and equity markets has been based 
on the assumption that shareholders are able to constrain the managers to behave in their (the 
shareholders') interests. However, the assumption that shareholders can constrain managers 
is quite a strong one which has faced many criticisms. Asymmetric information may be one 
source of difficulties in that managers have more information available to them on the current 
performance of the firm, and therefore on their own performance, than the shareholders, thus 
making monitoring difficult. The managers also have at least some scope to decide on which 
information should be disclosed to their investors and so have an incentive to select 
information which depicts them in a favourable light (see Foley, I 990b). In addition, non-
institutional investors are often small and far removed from the company therefore not 
imposing much pressure on the management (see Capie and CoIlins, 1992). 
Despite these difficulties the takeover market provides one method by which pressure 
may be exerted on managerial behaviour. Poor performance on the part of managers will be 
reflected in the share price of the firm. If the share price of the firm falls this may leave it 
vulnerable to takeover which, if it occurs, can lead to the manager losing prestige, power or 
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could even result in dismissal (see Capie and ColI ins, 1992). This argument has become more 
prevalent during the 1980's due to the large increase in takeover activity during this period. 
The threat of takeover causes managers to keep one eye on what the share price is doing and 
to behave in such a way that the share price will be maintained at a high level to relieve the 
threat of takeover and to keep the cost of capital down.Williams (1991) expresses the fear 
that a manager with one eye on the fluctuations of the company stock price in this way cannot 
be focusing completely on the objective of obtaining true long term wealth for the shareholder. 
Since the functioning of the capital markets compels the manager to look for short-term 
results, this must mean that the manager discounts the future at a high rate in that he has a 
greater preference for projects which yield returns sooner rather than later. 
In comparison with the UK, the level of acquisition activity in France and Germany 
is much lower and hostile takeovers virtually non-existent, with changes relating to industry 
restructuring rather than to corporate control as such (see Henderson, 1993). This finding is 
supported by Mayer and Alexander (1990) and Wass (1990) who find much more significant 
barriers to takeovers and mergers in many European economies relative to the US and UK. 
The effectiveness of shareholders in constraining managers in the UK may be 
illustrated by the sharp contrast between the rate of change of R&D expenditure and that 
devoted to dividend payments. The dividend payout ratio (dividends relative to cash flow) has 
become very high since 1986 with dividend payments in the UK rising at a rate of six times 
faster than the increase in R&D expenditure (see Henderson, 1993). A key feature of these 
changes has been the reluctance of firms to reduce their dividend payments; shareholders have 
Come to expect increases in dividend payments and so this is what occurs even though the 
28 
economic climate may dictate otherwise. In contrast, some sectors of industry, for example 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals, have been successful in persuading their shareholders of the 
merits of long-term investment projects such as R&D (see Williams, 1991). Indeed Foley 
(1 990b ) goes so far as to argue that having earned a reputation for the successful exploitation 
ofR&D, the market has come to expect regular announcements of new programmes; if they 
are not forthcoming the share price could weaken. 4 
Short-termism in equity markets, it has been argued, can be based on two assumptions: 
firstly, shareholders have a short-term perspective and secondly they have the ability to 
constrain managerial behaviour. The existence of this short-term perspective and hence the 
use of a high discount rate can be attributed to the features of capital markets such as 
asymmetric information, imperfect knowledge, moral hazard and takeover activity. The 
difficulties which arise as a result of these features may be accentuated by the presence of 
speculative activity and institutional investors. 
ii) Bankin~ System 
Another important component in the debate on short-termism is the banking system 
(see Hutton, 1991). Typically the UK banking system has been compared and contrasted to 
systems elsewhere and in particular to countries such as Germany and Japan. Those claiming 
4 It has been noted, however, that it is necessary to consider what happens to the funds paid out as 
dividends~ there is a possibility, often a strong one, that such funds will be reinvested. Recognising this 
possibility then raises the question of who are the best allocators of resources, managers or shareholders? (see 
Buckle and Thompson, 1992). 
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that the nature of the banking system leads to short-termism maintain that it is the contrast 
between the UK system and those elsewhere which contributes to the difference in the overall 
performance of industry across countries. 
The differences in international banking systems have been considered by Vittas 
(1986) using a framework composed of the following criteria: the degree of closeness; the 
form of relationship between banks and firms; internal machinery for maintaining 
relationships and external machinery for maintaining relationships. The degree of closeness 
refers to the "frequency and level of contact between financial institutions and industrial 
companies, the interest taken in the affairs of industrial companies and the extent of influence 
exerted over company affairs", (Vittas, 1986, p4). Internal machinery for establishing and 
maintaining relationships includes branch management, specialist departments, industrial 
specialists and the appointment of account executives. The external machinery includes the 
exchange of staff, the appointment of retired bank managers as company directors, the use of 
non-executive directorships, the exercise of voting rights (including proxy rights), the use of 
independent analysts and credit rating agencies and finally, the use of planning committees 
and development agencies. 
The UK banking system is often contrasted with those of Germany and Japan, the 
resultant argument being that the different systems contribute to relatively good economic 
performance in Germany and Japan and relatively poor economic performance in the UK. The 
German system is characterised by the following features: the existence of large universal 
banks; the use of a house bank; bank management often hold positions on supervisory boards 
and bank control of voting rights. A universal bank operates in both retail deposit taking and 
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also the financing of industry through avenues such as underwriting, brokerage and ownership 
of financial and corporate debt. The universal banking system is such that only "weak walls" 
exist between each banking activity, i.e. the banks can cover a wide range of activities. The 
relationship created by universal banking is further enhanced by the use of house banks by 
firms whereby an individual company will use one large bank for most of their financial 
needs. This house bank will also act as a lead bank whenever syndicated loans are required. 
A third feature of the German system is that bank management are widely represented on 
supervisory company boards (see Cable, 1985). Supervisory boards monitor corporate policies 
and the performance of management, but it is mainly through a supportive role, giving an 
element of protection (see Henderson, 1993). The bank can also own shares in the firm thus 
giving it further insight into the firm. Of considerable importance is the ability of German 
banks to act as proxies for shareholders who deposit their shares with them, thus giving them 
more opportunities to influence the firm's management. 
Japan differs from other countries, not only in terms of the banking system itself, but 
also in the overall industrial structure. A key feature of the Japanese system is the existence 
of large industrial groups or "Keiretsu". In the Japanese banking system itself banks have 
diversified into a range of activities but unlike the German banks there is a large amount of 
segmentation in the banking market, with the banks being separated into several specialised 
areas. The Japanese system does however share some similarities with the German system 
in that banks are permitted to hold stocks of non-financial companies up to a limit of 5% with 
the main bank of a consortium acting as monitor and co-ordinator. The overall evidence from 
the Japanese system is that it embodies a very different attitude to the whole process of debt 
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provision than that experienced in the UK or indeed from systems elsewhere. Starting at the 
screening process there is a tendency on the part of Japanese banks to put more weight on the 
valuation of firms as going concerns and on current profitability rather than possible default 
risk. After the loan has been agreed, further links are established between the bank and the 
firm through the monitoring process. Important features of this role include quarterly 
presentations by the borrower to the bank, extensive visiting by the bank's personnel to the 
firm and even the exchange of personnel. It is not unusual for bank personnel to visit the 
firms on a weekly or more frequent basis (see Mayer, 1987). The level of contact between 
banks and industry is in general frequent and extensive, covering several levels of the 
company hierarchy. Bilateral consultation and exchange of information are widespread, as 
is multilateral consultation through national planning bodies. Information and advice are also 
exchanged, in addition to the direct issues in hand, on wider issues such as interest rate or 
exchange rate changes. Similar to the German house bank, Japanese firms use a main bank 
which acts as both bank and financial adviser and would be responsible for drawing up a 
rescue plan in times of trouble. In Japan considerable use is made of specialist research 
departments and bank staff often have a large amount of industrial and specialist knowledge. 
As with other Japanese contractual agreements a key feature is the sharing of risk between 
both parties; banks earn above normal loan charges during the boom years, but below normal 
charges during the downturn. 
In the UK the key roles for commercial banks consist of deposit taking and short term 
commercial lending with long-term finance being catered for through the capital markets, 
though there is still an important role for investment bank underwriters. A key characteristic 
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of the UK banking sector is the short-tenn nature of its lending activities. Between 1985 and 
1990 the National Westminster Bank trebled its UK lending but of the £31 bn increase over 
half comprised loans of less than one year in duration. In contrast, the Deutsche Bank issues 
over half of its loans for four years or longer (see Hutton, 1991). The UK banking sector 
however, emphasises the importance of overdraft finance with overdrafts accounting for 56% 
of small firm debt in the UK compared to 14% in Germany (see Bank of England, 1994). The 
overdraft system carries the advantage that it is relatively simple to operate, with no need for 
a new account to be set up for each loan, and also incorporates a degree of flexibility in that 
firms can borrow the amount that suits them subject to the agreed limit. However, in reality, 
the overdrafts do have to be renegotiated on a regular basis where they may be reduced or 
severe conditions imposed. Although overdrafts are nominally short-term finance many 
businesses see them as a permanent source of finance and do not expect them to be 
withdrawn. The renegotiation or withdrawal of an overdraft may lead to misunderstanding 
and resentment between a firm and its bank (see HMSO, 1994). The overdraft system also 
presents difficulties for the banking sector itself; uncertainty is created since at anyone time 
only half the agreed limits are actually taken up and therefore banks must hold Iow yielding 
assets in sufficient quantities to be able to meet any increases in overdraft usage (see Morgan, 
1981). 
Nevertheless it is maintained that relations between firms and their banks in the UK , 
have become much closer over the past decade or so due to an increasing reliance by firms on 
bank borrowing and the expansion of medium term loan facilities (see Vittas, 1986); 
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"The need to prevent the collapse of companies during the deep recession of recent 
years has forced financial institutions to play a more active part in the restructuring of 
companies in difficulty." (Vittas, 1986, p5) 
In France and the US relationships between banks and firms are less close than in 
Germany and Japan but still involve frequent contact with banks maintaining a high degree 
of interest in company affairs. In both these countries consultation and information exchange 
between borrower and lender is extensive as are interlocking directorships. In France, whilst 
lead banks do exist, they adopt a different role to those in Germany and Japan in that French 
firms often appoint a different bank as lead bank for different loan syndicates rather than using 
the same bank. Industrial specialists are also an important part of the French banking system 
and the same is true of the US system. The exchange of staff between banks and firms is 
carried out less in France and the UK than the other three countries in the sample. However, 
former top treasury officials in France are often appointed to large banks and industrial 
companies which helps to improve relations between banks and industry. In the US by 
contrast, exchange of staff is commonplace. In the US and the UK the dissemination of 
information concerning firms is also carried out by stock-brokers (see Vittas, 1986). 
Clearly then, different countries have different banking systems with differing degrees 
of closeness between banks and firms. The bank-based systems of Germany, Japan and France 
display the closest relationship whilst the UK exhibits the most distant relationship, more so 
even than its capital-market-based counterpart the US. The key question now is how do these 
differences in banking systems manifest themselves in short-termism? In assessing a project 
the problem facing a bank is to assess the quality of both the borrower and also the proposed 
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project. Similar to equity markets a key problem which arises in achieving this is that of 
asymmetric information. The asymmetry problem present is that the borrower has better 
information relating to the amount of risk and future cash flows than that available to the 
lender (see Diamond. 1984). Further problems may also arise due to the existence of moral 
hazard. that is the potential incentive borrowers have to misrepresent the true risks associated 
with the investment. Therefore the accuracy with which the present value of an investment 
is arrived at will depend on the information available to the assessor. To obtain further 
information concerning the riskiness of a project is both difficult and costly to the lender. 
These difficulties are further compounded by the public good aspects of information. Even 
though information may be seen as private in the sense that the acquirer does not have to pass 
on information to other interested parties, the nature of the information they have acquired 
may be deduced from the bank's actions. For example the granting of a bank loan to a 
particular company imparts positive signals to other potential investors. James (1987) and 
Slovin et al (1988) confirm that share prices rise after a loan agreement has been established. 
The ease with which the lender may access the information required to arrive at the 
present value ofan investment will differ across the various financial structures (see DriscolI, 
1991 ). The difficulties created by asymmetric information may be alleviated by improved 
information flows which may, in turn, be brought about by the establishment of a close 
relationship between borrower and lender. The moral hazard problem may also be reduced 
by improved information flows through the reduction in opportunities for such behaviour. 
Therefore those systems creating close relationships between borrower and lender should 
alleviate asymmetric information and moral hazard problems to a greater extent. 
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Vittas (1986) argues that the relationship between banks and industry is closest in 
Japan where the 'back-drop' of the industrial group facilitates frequent and extensive contact. 
Relationships are also close in Germany due to the existence of universal banking, whereas 
relationships in France and the US are less close and are even more distant in the UK. 
Within the universal banking system the firm uses the bank for a wide range of 
services thus enabling an on-going relationship to be established. The heavy dependency 
placed on bank: finance by the firm results in a substantial flow of information concerning the 
corporate plans and performance of the firm. The use of one bank: by a firm for many banking 
services reduces the information costs to the bank: the bank already has had to acquire 
information in relation to the other services provided and so the marginal cost of providing 
an additional service is relatively low. Monitoring costs are also lower as the bank is already 
undertaking some monitoring of the firm with respect to other loans and services. The 
relationship created by universal banking is further enhanced by the existence of the house or 
lead bank: which has the additional effect of reducing competition in the banking market. The 
bank is willing to provide support during financial distress as the relationship between 
borrower and lender is not eroded by competition during more affiuent times. Information 
flows are also enhanced in Germany through the use of proxy voting rights. In addition to 
informational advantages the bank can also benefit from a greater ability to constrain the 
behaviour of managers such that they behave in the shareholders interest (see Cable, 1985). 
The relationship is maintained by bank management holding positions on supervisory boards, 
again giving further insight into the firm. 
Similar arguments can be presented for the Japanese banking system where the 
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existence of large industrial groups and the nature of the banking system itself serve to 
improve information flows. There is an on-going long-term relationship between banks and 
industry maintained by extensive contact and exchange of information between banks and 
firms, thereby reducing the marginal costs of providing further loans and monitoring existing 
ones. The use of specialist institutions and staff also enables a more accurate assessment of 
the risk involved in a particular project. 
The literature surveyed has shown that the UK has not displayed the extensive 
relationship between banks and industry that has been established in the other four countries, 
particularly Germany and Japan. One contributor to, or result of, this distant relationship is 
the nature of the lending undertaken, i.e. the short-term nature oflending and the renegotiation 
difficulties encountered therein. The relationship between the banks and industry in the UK, 
therefor~, is primarily a distant one involving mostly the monitoring, and implementation, of 
overdraft facilities with little bilateral consultation and exchange of information taking place. 
Vittas (1986) argues that the difficulties encountered in the exchange of information have 
been further compounded by the fragmentation of the banking market brought about by 
increased competition in the banking sector. This has been accompanied by the decline in the 
role of the lead bank and so has consequently led to problems of co-ordination especially 
during times of financial distress. 
A second advantage accruing in bank-orientated systems is that agency costs which 
arise due to conflicting interests on the part of shareholders and debtholders can be held to a 
minimum (see Driscoll, 1991). These are a result of key features of bank-based systems: 
improved information flows, equity shareholdings by banks and bank management holding 
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positions on company boards. Given these features of bank-orientated financial systems, in 
particular the creation of a close relationship between the bank and the firm, it seems 
reasonable to expect that the monitoring and control of the bank's clients would be both easier 
and more effective. The advantages accruing in the bank-orientated systems are therefore, 
according to Driscoll. twofold~ firstly. banks have more information about the firm and the 
project and secondly, agency costs which arise due to conflicting interests on the part of 
shareholders and debtholders can be held to a minimum. By moving towards a system where 
financial intermediaries are responsible for monitoring, agency costs can be reduced through 
the expertise and knowledge which is developed. 
" Information asymmetries are likely to be lowest in situations where banks provide 
a substantial proportion of a firm's debt finance and at the same time have a large 
equity interest." (Driscoll, 1991, p7) 
Therefore, the UK banking system encounters problems in investment appraisal which 
are similar to those encountered in equity markets, i.e. problems of asymmetric information, 
moral hazard and princip~l agent problems. The close relationship developed by bank-based 
systems such as those in Germany and Japan lead to improved information flows which, in 
turn, improve the accuracy with which the present value of a project can be calculated. The 
use of industrial specialists also facilitates more accurate risk assessment. Increasing the 
accuracy with which banks can appraise a project reduces the risk premium required by lender 
and therefore reduces the discount rate. In the UK, by contrast, the relationship between banks 
and firms is more distant resulting in poorer information flows. The greater difficulty in 
assessing risk results in a higher risk premium being required, hence producing a denominator 
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effect. 
Hi) Managers 
The previous explanations put forward for the undervaluation of investments by 
managers have expressed the problem as one experienced by the managerial function of the 
firm, but yet initiated by some outside factor such as the working of financial markets. The 
set of theories presented in this section suggest that it is the managers themselves, rather than 
outside pressures, who create short-term problems i.e. managers either underestimate future 
returns or use an excessive discount rate. Marsh (1990, p52) identifies areas where short-term 
attitudes are initiated by the managers themselves and defines managerial short-term ism as 
, 
" [T]he tendency for corporate managers to favour the sh9rt-term quite independently 
'I 
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of any spur from the financial markets." 
Marsh argues that it is the managers who are responsible for the level of long-term real 
investment in a firm and when making investment decisions will inevitably consider their own 
personal interests as well as those of the firm. Marsh cites the following criteria as being 
important influences on the decisions a manager will take: remuneration schemes; anticipated 
time horizon within present job/ company; project appraisal and intra-firm relationships. 
As far as the above criteria are concerned, contrasts are typically drawn between the 
OK (and the US) and Japan. The UK and US are reported to use managerial schemes linking 
reward to short-term indicators such as accounting profit (see Quinn, 1981), whereas in Japan 
it is usual for firms to use company wide bonus schemes favouring long-term performance 
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(see Abegglen and Stalk, 1985). Rewards to managers in Japan are often based on long-term 
performance in the organisation with salaries determined by seniority, experience, and 
individual appraisal (see McMillan, 1985). The effects of long-term remuneration schemes 
are accentuated by the time horizon of managers within the firm. The level of mobility of 
managers between firms varies greatly across countries with Japan at one extreme being 
linked to "life-time" employment (see Odagiri, 1988) whilst the UK and US experience 
relatively high mobility. An approximate guideline to the level of mobility amongst US 
executives was given as "three years per job" and "five years per company" (see Harvard 
Business Review, 1988). 
UK management are singled out further with respect to the methods used to carry out 
investment appraisal. Of particular concern is the extent to which the payback method is used 
with Barton et al (1989) finding that two-thirds of their respondents always used this method 
of investment appraisal. Using a payback criterion necessarily results in short-termism since 
it ignores all cash flows beyond the payback period. Even if a discounted cash flow technique 
is used, problems may still arise. Frequently expressed concerns are that discount rates used 
in investment appraisal are above those implied by capital markets (see Myers, 1984). 
Secondly, Hodder and Riggs (1985, p131) argue that the use of a discounted cash flow 
technique can still result in incorrect investment decisions being made due to managerial 
errors in dealing with risk and inflation, 
"It is difficult to know how widespread such errors have been during recent years, but 
almost surely they explain in part the shift toward shorter-lived projects and myopic 
investment decisions in many businesses." 
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In contrast to the approach in the UK and US, Japanese companies employ more ad 
hoc methods of investment appraisal. Odagiri (1989) highlights the emphasis in Japanese 
firms on the contribution of the investment to corporate growth along with other criteria such 
as the effect on market share and on the firm's product portfolio (see Economic Planning 
Agency, 1982). The time value of money used by Japanese managers is often simply the 
prevailing interest rate (see Hodder, 1986), with the implication that the discount rate is, if 
anything, underestimated rather than overestimated. 
The final area which Marsh argues may lead to managerial short-termism is that of 
intra-firm relationships, e.g. the relationship between head office and divisions. Barton et al 
(1989) found substantial differences in opinion between parent companies and divisions over 
a large number of investment issues. Concerns were often felt by the divisions about the 
knowledge and ability of managers to evaluate investment projects with senior management 
being far removed from the divisions and also carrying responsibility for a number of divisions 
covering many areas. A further finding of this study was that managers felt more constrained 
by internal financial constraints such as quick payback and capital rationing than by external 
financial constraints. Many of these problems have been attributed to the prevalence of the 
multidivisional structure of companies within the UK and US which, in contrast, is less 
common in Japan. A feature of Japanese firms is the larger amount of involvement and 
control by management (see Odagiri, 1988). 
In summary, various scenarios have been described which may lead to short-term 
attitudes by managers, i.e. remuneration schemes, investment appraisal techniques, time 
horizons of managers within firms and intra-firm relationships. The presence of these factors 
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leads to an emphasis by managers on the short-term and hence to the use of a higher discount 
rate, i.e. a denominator effect exists. In additio~ errors in dealing with risk and inflation 
introduce noise into the system which may increase the risk premium required by managers 
again creating a denominator effect. 
iy) MacroecoDom ic Climate 
Whilst not explicitly concurring with Marsh that it is managers who create problems 
of short-termism, Henderson (1993) and Eltis et al (1992) do point to one aspect of the UK. 
economic environment which may make a satisfactory choice of the numerator and 
denominator difficult, that being the presence of economic volatility. The impact of economic 
stability was also cited as an important influence on investment in the government paper 
"Competitiveness: Helping Business to Win" (HMSO 1994), along with low inflation and 
interest rates. The macroeconomic climate that the UK. firm experiences differs greatly from 
that experienced in other countries. Henderson (1993), for example, contrasts the stable 
economic environments of Germany and Japan with the unstable and unpredictable UK. 
economy. The presence of economic volatility in an economy makes prediction of future cash 
flows, and therefore the calculation of the present value of an investment, difficult. This 
uncertainty may reasonably be expected to lead to a numerator effect: in the face of 
uncertainty managers have difficulty in forecasting future cash flows and hence may be 
conservative in their estimation of future cash flows. 
Considering the problem of inflation in more detail, how can higher inflation be 
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associated with the undervaluation of future cash flows? Firstly, during times of accelerating 
inflation it is reasonable to expect that firms will begin to anticipate government deflationary 
policies within two to four years (see Eltis et aI, 1992) thus giving managers a pessimistic 
view of the future. The macroeconomic environment in which the UK operates is one which 
fluctuates between slump, as experienced over the late 1980's and early 1990's, and prosperity 
accompanied by accelerating inflation. On the other hand, countries such as Germany and 
Japan have not faced such difficulties: 
"Because Germany and Japan had far less inflation, fluctuations of GNP were less, so 
there was less stop-go that has made good long term decision making and planning 
difficult for British business." (Eltis et aI, 1992, pIS) 
Even without the problems of stop-go a recent feature of the UK economy is the co-
existence of inflation and recession. As a result firms have not been able to pass higher input 
prices onto the consumer and have faced severe financial difficulties. Firms have also been 
affected by higher effective tax rates resulting from inflationary pressures. The lack of 
indexation of tax depreciation allowances and stock appreciation have meant that the presence 
of inflation has increased the effective tax rate resulting in a reduction in the after-tax 
profitability of investment projects (see Marsh, 1990). Eltis et al go on to argue that lower 
inflation in Germany and Japan has led to lower nominal interest rates and, in general, 
companies in these countries have experienced a higher rate of return, with the average rate 
of return being 2 or 3 times that of the British levels. Together, the combination of greater 
macroeconomic stability and lower interest rates afford German and Japanese companies more 
'breathing space' such that companies can borrow with a smaller risk of loss of ownership if 
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something goes wrong, and, at the same time, banks are more likely to receive full repayment. 
EItis et al (1992) see this gap between profit rates and interest rates as a major contributor to 
the short-term perspective of managers in the UK. The combination of economic volatility 
and the financial tightness faced by UK firms has further served to be detrimental to 
investment by forcing senior management in the UK to concentrate more on financial issues, 
giving them less scope to focus on issues such as technology enhancement and skill 
development relative to their foreign counterparts. 
The increased macroeconomic instability in the UK may bring about both denominator 
and numerator effects. Since uncertainty increases the further into the future a forecast is 
required, the effect of greater economic volatility is to create a preference for the shorter term 
where the outcome is more certain. This leads to an increase in the time value of money and 
hence a higher discount rate. A second denominator effect may be felt through the risk 
premium: the greater uncertainty leads to the need for a greater risk premium to compensate 
investors for taking on this additional risk. The increased economic instability can cause a 
numerator effect as the increased difficulty in assessing the future economic environment in 
turn makes forecasting future cash flows more difficult. This may cause investors to err on 
the cautious side therefore underestimating rather than overestimating future cash flows. 
Ill) CONCLUSION 
The expression short-term ism has been used to cover a wide range of characteristics 
of both UK financial markets and the UK management sector. Short-termism has been the 
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subject of much debate including what short-termism actually is and how it is caused. A 
major shortcoming with the existing literature is the lack of clarity in the definition of short-
termism, with many authors omitting completely to define short-termism. A characteristic 
feature of the literature, on all aspects of short-term ism, is the diversity it displays; each paper 
seems to bring with it a different representation of short-termism, often concentrating on only 
one aspect of the financial system with a bias in the literature towards equity markets. The 
aim of this chapter has been to draw together the various approaches to provide a 
comprehensive explanation of the concept of short-termism. A key aim has been to develop 
a concise definition on which further, empirical work may be carried out. 
In order to achieve this aim, emphasis has been placed on the way in which the present 
value of an investment is arrived at, i.e. the discounting of future expected cash flows to obtain 
a value of the investment in today's terms. By drawing all the approaches to short-termism 
together the meaning of short-termism becomes clearer and may be described as situations 
where the characteristics of financial markets, or the players themselves, lead to the value of 
long-term returns being understated either due the use of Iow numerator terms or a high 
discount rate. This definition results in two possible ways in which short-termism may 
manifest itself: the numerator effect and the denominator effect. 
The numerator effect describes situations in which the numerator terms of the present 
value equation (equation 2.1) are lower than would rationally be expected, thus resulting in 
a lower present value for the investment project under consideration. The numerator effect 
can be interpreted as cases in which cash flows are unduly pessimistic. From the discussion 
presented here it can be seen that whilst the numerator effect may have an important impact 
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on investment projects carried out, it is difficult to explain why such an effect may exist. The 
main explanation given here is that in the presence of a large degree of uncertainty, due to, for 
example, an unstable economic environment, managers may err on the conservative side thus 
underestimating future cash flows. Alternatively managers, in times of high inflation, may 
anticipate deflationary government policies, again giving them perhaps a pessimistic outlook 
of future cash flows. 
The denominator effect describes those situations in which a higher discount rate is 
used by investors. The use of a higher discount rate has the effect of reducing the present 
value of an investment. This chapter has presented many explanations as to why investors 
across different types offinancial markets should use a high discount rate. In equity markets, 
for example, short-termism may arise due to the existence of asymmetric information, 
imperfect knowledge, speculative activity or the behaviour of institutional investors. In the 
banking sector asymmetric information between borrower and lender is again an important 
contributor to short-term behaviour. The nature of the banking system has been shown to have 
potentially important implications for investment. Managers may themselves be responsible 
for the existence of short-termism through the working practices they adopt and the 
investment appraisal techniques they use. Finally, the macroeconomic climate was also 
argued to have an important effect on investment. It should be noted that both the numerator 
and denominator effects may be the result of either a rational response to the functioning of 
the market or the result of irrational behaviour on the part of investors. For example, in the 
former case a higher discount rate may be required to cover for higher risk arising from market 
features such as asymmetric information, whilst in the latter investors may require a higher 
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discount rate without the corresponding risk differences. 
This chapter has sought to place the existing literature on short-tennism into a 
framework based on the discounting process. The various approaches to short-tennism have 
been interpreted here as either a numerator effect or a denominator effect even though many 
of the studies do not explicitly link themselves with the discounting process. Where the 
discount rate is considered explicitly, as in Miles 1993, it is considered in tenns of the 
discount rate as a whole. However, it has also been seen in this chapter that the discount rate 
is composed of the investor's time value of money and a risk premium. Whilst the outcome 
of a higher discount rate is the same, i.e. investments will be undervalued, it is also of interest 
to know why a higher discount rate is used. Therefore an important part of the remainder of 
this thesis will be to breakdown the discount rate into its various components and consider 
each as a potential cause of short-tennism. 
In addition to creating a framework in which to place the various definitions of short-
termism this chapter has also emphasised the extent and importance of differences across 
international financial systems. A basic distinction was drawn between those countries using 
bank-based systems and those using capital-market-based systems where Gennany and Japan 
were used as examples of the fonner and the UK and US as examples of the latter. The basic 
premise from the literature is that bank-based systems are much better able to create close, 
10ng-tenn relationships between banks and industry than capital-market-based systems. The 
existence of a close relationship enables any infonnationaI and monitoring difficulties that a 
lender may face to be reduced. The UK in contrast has traditionally been associated with an 
arms-length relationship between banks and industry accentuating problems such as 
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asymmetric information causing banks to concentrate on the short-term. 
The discussion presented here has shown the extent of the concern with short-termism 
and has illustrated the extensive potential for such a phenomenon to exist. The following 
chapters will consider evidence as to whether short-termism does exist in UK financial 
markets, providing empirical support to the so far largely theoretical debate. In addition to 
this, a further hypothesis to be examined is whether or not any differences in investment 
behaviour may be linked to the type of financial system prevalent in a particular country. The 
assumptions made in the following chapters will necessarily narrow the scope of the tests into 
the existence of short-termism. These assumptions form an important part of the analysis and 
clarify the scope for further research. 
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fUAPTER 3: A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF SOME UK EVIDENCE 
I) INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are many different ways in which short-termism may 
be said to arise and many explanations for its occurrence. The various approaches to short-
termism were drawn together to provide a more concise definition of short-termism as a 
situation in which the value of long-term returns is understated either through the 
underestimation offuture cash flows or the use of a high discount rate given the level of risk 
involved. These two effects were referred to as the numerator and denominator effects 
respectively. 
The aim of this thesis is to carry out an empirical investigation into the issue of short-
termism and so the next question to be considered is how the numerator and denominator 
effects can be used to achieve this aim. Whilst the numerator effect provides a legitimate 
explanation of short-termism, it is recognised here that the lack of clarity into why such an 
effect should arise and also the practical difficulties in identifying whether or not cash flows 
are unduly pessimistic, 1 result in this effect providing an unsatisfactory basis for investigation 
into whether or not UK investors display short-term behaviour. The denominator effect, on 
the other hand, has been explained by the presence of a number of factors, as described in 
tIn practical terms the identification of 'rational' expected cash flows is extremely difficult The estimates 
of future expected cash flows are subjective estimates on the part of managers and investors who are unlikely to 
produce concurrent estimates. Firstly. the two groups will not have the same information on which to base their 
decisions and even when they have access to similar information, differences may arise in their cash flow 
estimates due to differences in interpretation and judgement (see Marsh. 1990). 
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Chapter 2, such as asymmetric information, imperfect knowledge, speculative activity or the 
behaviour of institutional investors. Although it is extremely difficult to ascertain a discount 
rate that would be the "rational" rate for appraising a given project or investment, further 
insight into the issue of short-term ism may be acquired by considering relative discount rates 
across countries. The comparison of international discount rates will allow us to assess 
whether discount rates used by UK investors are indicative of short-termist behaviour. 2 It is 
assumed that investors would not invest if they did not receive the return they required and 
hence the discount rate will be proxied by rates of return. The denominator effect, in contrast 
to the numerator effect, therefore provides a more directly testable hypothesis and so it is the 
denominator effect which will form the focus for the remainder of the thesis. 
As has been argued in the preceding chapters, the restriction of this research to a 
certain strain of short-tennism is necessary due to the diverse nature of the various approaches 
to short-termism. The denominator effect will be further restricted to specific factors as 
outlined in the following section. The interpretation of short-tennism as a denominator effect 
in this way still covers a large number of instances where short-termism might arise, and 
hence, provides a useful contribution to the debate on whether or not UK investors are short-
tennist. 
The basic premise to be examined, then, in assessing whether or not UK investors are 
short-termist is whether the required rate of return of UK investors is higher than that 
2When interpreting the results from such a comp~on. cauti?n m~t be exercised as the diffe:ences in . 
returns may be due to differing risk levels across countnes. A polOt which needs to be made here IS that even If 
the higher discount rate is justified by a higher risk level this still results in firms facing demands by investors 
for higher returns thus increasing their cost of capital. . 
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experienced in other countries. Yet how does such a proposition fit in with theories on 
international interest rate parity? The concept of international interest rate parity arises 
through the International Fisher Effect which states that, assuming no transactions costs and 
no restrictions on capita] movements, real interest rates will be equalised across countries. 
If interest parity conditions do hold such that real interest rates are equalised across countries , 
then clearly a phenomenon such as short-termism could not prevail in a particular country as 
higher interest rates would attract investment from overseas, thereby eliminating any interest 
rate differences. 
Two conditions for real interest rates to be equalised across countries are that: 
Rt•l - Rt:l '" Et(St.l-St)llt (3.1) 
(3.2) 
where Rand R$ are the domestic and foreign nominal interest rates respectively, s the spot 
exchange rate, ~ the information available at time period t, p and p* are the domestic and 
foreign price levels respectively. The first condition required for real interest rate equalisation 
across countries, shown in equation (3.1), states that differences in nominal interest rates are 
equal to the anticipated rate of change in the exchange rate, that is, nominal interest rates are 
equalised by changes in the exchange rate. In order for real rates to be equal across countries 
a second condition that is required is the presence of Purchasing Power Parity, as shown in 
equation (3.2), which states that any differences in the price level between two countries will 
be equal to the anticipated change in the exchange rate. The presence of the Purchasing Power 
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Parity condition is necessary to ensure that real interest rates do not differ as a result of 
differing international inflation rates. 
Many studies have been carried out examining the validity of this interest rate equality 
(Mishkin 1984b, Cumby and Mishkin (1986) Cumby and Obstfeld (1984) Merrick and 
Saunders (1986)). The results in general do not support interest rate equalisation, a result 
which appears to be robust across countries, interest rates and price deflators. Mark(1985) 
extends this analysis by adjusting interest rates for differences in national tax rates and still 
does not find evidence to support interest rate equalisation. Further questions have been raised 
about the distinction between ex ante expected rates and ex post realised rates, an issue which 
was addressed by Cumby and Mishkin (1986) whose study did not alter the basic results 
outlined above. The lack of evidence in favour of interest parity, therefore, allows for the 
possibility of interest rate differences to prevail as a result of short-termism and permits the 
use of interest rate differences as a measure of short-termism. 
Short-termism, it has been argued, can be identified by the existence of a higher 
required rate of return, and so the assertion that UK investors are short-termist in their outlook 
will be tested by considering real interest rates across a sample of countries. This work will 
concentrate on equities, government bonds and Treasury bills, making use of the fundamental 
differences between these three types of finance. The composition of the rate of return on 
each of these types of investment will be used to draw inferences about investor behaviour in 
each country. 
Treasury bills are short-term government debt and consequently suffer from little, if 
any, default risk. Due to the nature of these bills they are often referred to as risk-free 
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investments and hence provide an important insight into the time value of money exhibited 
by investors in each country. A comparison of equity and bond capital highlights their 
differing features and, as a result, the differing levels of risk associated with them. The other 
two types of finance, equities and bonds, give further information on investors' behaviour in 
other markets and also allow the consideration of comparative risk premia. This is an 
important inclusion as the denominator effect, as shown in equation 2.2, can manifest itself 
as either a higher risk-free rate or a higher risk premium. Equity capital represents a 
permanent loan to the company or project; as such equity holders become part-holders in the 
finn. The annual return to the investor, in the form of dividend payments, is not contractually 
arranged but is at the discretion of the management (and is dependent on the performance of 
the firm). In times of financial distress the shareholders are legally behind bondholders in the 
queue for funds and so may end up with little or no return to their investment. Bondholders, 
in contrast, are not seen as part-owners ofthe firm but are instead regarded as creditors of the 
company, having given a loan to be repaid at a later date. Due to the differences between 
bonds and equity the latter is argued to be a more risky investment. Given that equity is a 
riskier investment a higher rate of return will be required by investors. 
The hypothesis to be examined in this chapter, therefore, is that short-term ism, 
interpreted as a denominator effect, is present among UK investors. Due to the absence of an 
appropriate benchmark, the study will incorporate international comparisons of real rates of 
return to assess whether the discount rates used by UK investors are higher than those used 
elsewhere. This approach also facilitates the consideration of the influence of the differing 
international financial systems on economic performance. The analysis will draw on three 
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fonns of finance: Treasury bills, equities and government bond finance utilising their differing 
features to calculate the time value of money and various risk premia. 
The remainder of the chapter will be set out as follows: section II will discuss the 
components of the required rate of return of investors, HI considers the methodology to be 
used, IV presents and discusses the results and finally V offers a conclusion. 
11) COMPONENTS OF REQUIRED RATE OF RETURN 
In Chapter 2 the rate of return was described as being composed of two components: 
the time value of money and a risk premium. Here the analysis is extended to consider 
additional components of the discount rate which are an inflation adjustment, a liquidity 
premi urn and an exchange rate risk premium. The rate of return required by an investor 
therefore may be composed of several elements; 
i) Time value of money 
ii) Inflation adjustment 
iii) Liquidity premium 
iv) Risk premium 
v) Exchange rate risk premium 
The relevance and importance of each of the five key components of the required rate 
of return will vary according to the type of investment carried out, i. e. whether the investment 
is in equity, government bonds or Treasury bills. 
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i) The Time Value of Money (re) 
This component, also referred to as the risk-free rate, covers the opportunity cost of 
deferring consumption until a future date. In other words, even when investors are certain that 
they will receive their investment back at the same real value and at the agreed time, a 
payment is still required to compensate them for delaying consumption. If a group of 
investors has a higher time value of money or is more "impatient" this will result in a higher 
required rate of return, ceteris paribus. This element of the overall required rate of return is 
particularly important to the issue of short-termism with the existence of a high time value of 
money implying investors place greater emphasis on payments received in the near future. 
The time value of money is a fundamental part of the discount rate and will be present 
across all types of finance. This risk-free rate should theoretically be the same whether debt 
or equity finance is used. If the risk-free rate does differ across the two types of investment 
this suggests there are two types of investor: one who invests in equity and one who invests 
in debt, with different preferences regarding the time value of money. 
ii) Inflation Adjustment (ne) 
In the absence of inflation, payments received in future time periods will have the 
same purchasing power as those received in the present time period and, therefore, the value 
to an investor of receiving £1 today or £1 in a year's time will differ only by the opportunity 
cost of delaying consumption as described above. However, if inflation is present the discount 
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rate used to appraise an investment will have to be adjusted to take into account the 
inflationary impact on future cash flows. For example. if a sum of £100 is borrowed at a rate 
of interest of 8% when expected inflation is 0%, in a year's time the borrower will have to pay 
back £ 1 08 in real terms. If, on the other hand, inflation is present at a rate of 2% the borrower 
stilI pays back £108 nominally, but in real terms this sum is not worth as much as under the 
scenario of zero inflation. (The value of the sum has been reduced by inflated prices meaning 
the lender can no longer purchase so much with the £108 as he could have done with zero 
inflation). The Fisher equation (Fisher, 1930) suggests that the inflation adjustment should 
take the following form: 
(3.3) 
where Rc = inflation-adjusted discount rate, re = risk free required real rate of return, ne = 
expected rate of inflation. 3 
So the inflation-adjusted risk-free discount rate is as follows; 
Using the example above; 
= (1 + 0.8)(1 + 0.2) 
= 1.08 x 1.02 
= 1.1016 
= 1.1016 - 1 = 0.1016 or 10.16% 
(3.4) 
3Since the cross product terms in this equation (i.e. (rf)('n;O» are quite small the Fisher Equation is often 
presented as Rr = rf + ne. 
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In the absence of rational expectations a further risk premium would be required to 
COver for errors in forecasting future inflation. When the investment is in bonds, uncertainty, 
and therefore risk, is introduced into the real value of interest payments. This risk cannot be 
isolated (using this methodology) but would be picked up by the liquidity premium i.e. the 
inflation risk would be part of the risk encountered by investors undertaking longer term 
investment. Theoretically the difficulties of inflation should not arise in the case of equities 
since as costs rise so do the firm's revenues thus maintaining the rate of return received by 
investors. 4 
iii) The Liquidity Premium (A) 
In addition to the risk-free rate, which rewards the investor for forgoing present 
consumption, the liquidity premium rewards the investor for holding assets which cannot be 
as readily used for cash. Generally short-term assets are regarded as being more liquid in the 
sense that they can be more readily converted into cash without the risk of a reduction in the 
capital value of the asset. If this is the case investors will require only a small liquidity 
premium (if any) on short-term assets. However, if borrowers want to induce investors to 
undertake longer-term investment they will need to pay a greater liquidity premium. The 
required rate of return will now be equal to (1 +r de 1 + i..) and so the return required by investors 
wiU be higher for longer-term investments. Borrowers will be quite willing to pay such a 
4If this does not hold as suggested by Marsh (1990) any reward required by investors in equities for inflation 
risk should be included in the equity risk premium. 
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premium in order to gain long-term funds, thus avoiding rollover risk associated with a series 
of short-term investments. 
Using a similar approach as the inflation adjustment 
(3.5) 
where rb = rate of return on bonds. 
This premium is not so relevant to equity investments as they are not taken up for a 
specific time and may be sold at any pOint. In addition any developments to the firm, such as 
a new investment project, should be reflected in the share price. 
iv) The Risk Premium (p) 
As described previously in Chapter 2 the risk premium is a payment, in addition to the 
basic discount rate r f; to compensate the investor for taking of risk involved in an investment. 
Strictly speaking in economics, a distinction can be made between risk and uncertainty 
where risk, a statistical concept, refers to situations in which the possible outcomes may be 
assigned probabilities. For example, it is possible to calculate the probability that a six will 
be thrown on a fair die. Uncertainty, on the other hand, as described by Knight (1921) refers 
to a situation whereby it is no longer possible to assign such probabilities. 
A large amount of the literature in the area of investment appraisal does not draw the 
above distinction between risk and uncertainty but rather the problems associated with the 
lack of certainty about the future are pulled together under the heading of risk, a term used in 
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literature on investment appraisal to describe, in fact, a situation somewhere between the usual 
meanings of risk and uncertainty. In practice, true probabilities for future cash flows cannot 
be found, particularly when considering projects such as a new project launch since empirical 
evidence is hard to find and experience of an identical nature is not available. Consequently, 
managers have to estimate what these probabilities might be, i.e. form some subjective 
valuation of probabilities. Pike (1992) argues that even in the case of a new project launch the 
manager is able to assess the risks involved using the information already available to him. 
Whilst the manager has no experience of the particular project slhe will have encountered 
similar projects and even ifthis is not so, he may draw on the general business knowledge of 
both himself and colleagues. According to Pike, it is this ability to estimate subjective 
probabilities that leads in practice to risk and uncertainty being treated as the same thing. Risk 
in these terms, therefore, lies somewhere between risk as a statistical concept and true 
uncertainty as outlined by Knight (1921). Whilst true probabilities cannot be assigned, as with 
risk, it is possible to form subjective probabilities on the basis of past, related experience, thus 
we are not dealing with true uncertainty. Therefore the phenomenon referred to as risk in 
investment appraisal often does not correspond to true statistical risk but rather to a concept 
which lies somewhere between risk and uncertainty .. It may be argued, however, that the 
element of uncertainty encountered in investment appraisal lies closer to risk than true 
uncertainty and hence the term risk will be used. 
The risk involved in an investment may arise for a number of reasons. Following a 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) type approach two types of risk may be identified; 
specific and market risk. Specific, or unsystematic, risk is the risk associated with the issuer 
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of a particular security and may arise out of factors such as the competency or experience of 
managers or the financial leverage of the firm. Specific risk is diversifiable and as such will 
not be priced in an efficient market. Market, or systematic, risk on the other hand, is the risk 
attached to the cash flow accruing to an asset that results from the dependency of the cash 
flow on market conditions. This risk is present for all assets, though it will vary as the 
relationship between the particular cash flow and market conditions varies, and so is not 
diversifiable. The effect of the presence of systematic risk is to add a risk premium to the 
basic rate of return required by investors in the following way: 
(3.6) 
where rj is the return on asset i, rf the return on the risk-free asset, rm the return on the market 
portfolio and Pi the relative volatility of asset ifs earnings compared to the market average. 5 
As shown in the previous chapter the different financial systems have often been 
argued to result in different risk premiums, culminating in differing discount rates. In 
particular, it is often argued that the association of Japanese and German systems with close 
banking relationships enables improved monitoring and information flows and therefore lower 
SIt should be noted that whilst a risk-adjusted discount rate is commonly used in the determination of an asset's 
fundamental value some difficulties can still occur with this method. The major problem is how this model 
represents risk over time. If a risk premium is included in the discount rate then risk increases exponentially over 
time. This approach is only appropriate where it may be argued that the effects of risk in time period 1 will be 
compounded in future time periods. In practice, however, risk is often expected to decrease over time therefore 
compensating at least partially for any compounding of risk that may take place. Taking again the example of a new 
product launch the greatest risk is likely to be at the start of the project, when its success is unknown, and decline 
over time as sales figures are obtained. Similarly, with research and development the initial, basic research is more 
often associated with greater levels or risk (normally regarded as 'true' uncertainty) than later stages such as product 
development. However, risk is usually thought of to be increasing over time since the further into the future the 
investment stretches then the more uncertain forecasts become not only in terms of the project itself but also more 
generally such as forecasts of economic conditions. It is this latter assumption which will be made throughout this 
work. 
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risk premiums. In additio~ the macroeconomic climate in these countries has reduced the 
amount of uncertainty in the business environment, so exerting downward pressure on the 
required risk premium. The risk premium to be considered here will be the premium required 
by investors to undertake equity investment, and consequently will only form part of the 
discount rate for this type of investment. 
(3.7) 
v) The Exchan2e Rate Risk Premium (E) 
Similarly, the return to the investor may be affected by an exchange rate change. 
When canying out international investment the return to a unit of domestic currency depends 
not only on the returns on the investment but also on the exchange rate between the domestic 
and foreign currency. For example. if the exchange rate between the foreign investor's country 
and the domestic country (the country in which investment is carried out) appreciates this 
would have the effect of increasing the value of the payment to the investor. For example, 
suppose the sterling-dollar exchange rate is currently 1: 1, an interest payment from a UK bond 
of £10 would be worth $10 to an American investor. However, if the exchange rate was to 
change to 1:2 (i.e. sterling appreciates) then the value of the same £10 payment would now 
be worth $20 to the American investor. As a result, even though there has been no change in 
the payment itself there is uncertainty, arising from the unpredictability of movements in the 
exchange rate, regarding the actual payment the investor will receive. The existence of a 
premium to cover this risk gives another adjusted discount rate obtained in a similar manner 
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to the previous discount fates 
(3.8) 
where fe = exchange risk adjusted discount rate, € = exchange rate risk premium. 
For the American investor, therefore, the return on the investment is composed of two 
components: the risk-free rate offered by the bond and secondly, the risk of any possible 
variation in the sterling-dollar exchange rate. However, according to the International Fisher 
Effect, as described in Section I, in equilibrium the rate of return received by the two investors 
on the two riskless assets should be the same. 
(3.9) 
where El = new exchange rate, Eo = original exchange rate, r(us) = return to American investor, 
rf.(uk) = risk-free return on British bonds. I.e. in equilibrium the return on the UK asset, fub is 
equal to the return on the American asset, ru", plus the expected currency movement. 
Under the assumption of rational expectations in the foreign exchange market, the 
expected currency movement should not cause problems to the investor since expected and 
actual exchange rates will only differ by a random error term with mean zero. The assumption 
that an exchange rate risk premium is not required by international investors as a result of the 
International Fisher Effect will be made here. This assumption will be relaxed in the 
following chapter allowing two hypotheses to be tested: firstly whether any differences in real 
interest rates may be attributed to an exchange rate risk premium, and secondly, whether the 
assumption of a zero exchange rate risk premium is a valid one to make. 
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vi) Total Adjusted Discount Rate (RO) 
The adjusted discount rates calculated above deal only with one type of adjustment 
or premium at a time and so a total adjusted discount rate, R*, is required, which may be 
formed from the individual discount rate components as follows; 
(l+R') • (1+r)(1+1tXl+1Xl+pXl+€) 
R' = (l+r)(1+1t)(l+lXl+p)(l+€) - 1 
or under the assumption of no exchange rate risk premium 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
As has been seen above however not all of the components will be relevant to the total 
adjusted discount rate for all assets. For example, the discount rate on bonds will not include 
the equity risk premium, p, whilst the rate on equities will not include the liquidity premium, 
A. It is these differences in the discount rate which will be employed as a means oflooking 
for evidence of short-termism amongst UK investors. 
Ill) LOOKING FOR EVIDENCE OF SHORT -TERMISM 
The aim of this thesis is to look for evidence of short-termism as defined by the 
denominator effect. As a result of the decomposition of the discount rate into the above 
components, two further sub-divisions may be made within this definition. The first, or "true" 
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short-termism, captures scenarios in which a particular group of investors display a higher 
time value of money, i.e. they have a greater preference to receive rewards in the short-term 
than other groups. The presence of this type of short-termism will be reflected in the existence 
of a higher risk-free rate, rf' "General" short-termism, on the other hand, will refer to the 
existence of a denominator effect resulting from any of the other components of the discount 
rate, e.g. the liquidity premium or equity risk premium. The first aim of this chapter will be 
to examine the evidence concerning the existence of "true" short-termism by establishing a 
measure of the time value of money in the UK, i.e. the estimation of r f The test for the 
presence of , 'true" short-term ism in the UK will take the form of asking whether the time value 
of money of investors is significantly higher from that of investors elsewhere. The test for 
"general" short-term ism will be concerned with asking whether any of the other components 
of the discount rate are significantly higher in the UK than elsewhere. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the countries to be used in the comparison with the UK will 
be Germany, Japan, France and US. These countries were chosen not only to provide a point 
of comparison for the UK but also because they allow a comparison to be made between the 
capital-market-based countries of the US and UK and the bank-based countries of Germany 
and Japan. France is also of interest here as a country in which the financial system lies 
somewhere between capital-market-based and bank-based. International comparisons, as has 
been mentioned above, are important not only for establishing whether or not the time value 
of money of a particular group of investors is higher than elsewhere, but also for examining 
the second hypothesis that differences exist in investors' behaviour linked to the type of 
financial system present in each country. The choice of countries in the sample reflects the 
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aims of this second hypothesis by including countries employing both capital-market-based 
and bank-based financial systems. 
i) Test 1: Time Value of Money 
The purpose of this first test is to test for the presence of "true" short-term ism, i.e. to 
test whether investors in the UK have a higher time value of money than investors in the other 
countries studied. The basis of the test will be to compare the risk-free rate earned by 
investors in each of the five countries, that is by estimating r f> where r f> it will be remembered, 
is the rate of interest that can be earned with certainty in the market. In order to carry out the 
analysis an asset is required which provides a measure of the risk-free rate. In section n, 
equation 3.11, the total discount rate was described as being composed as follows: 
An appropriate asset to use as a proxy for the risk-free rate should only contain the 
element rl' and not the default or liquidity risks or the inflation adjustment. The default risk, 
p, can be eliminated by considering government stock on which the default risk is generally 
assumed to be equal to, or at least close to, zero and, as a result no risk premium is required 
by the investor. The next component of the discount rate to consider is the inflation rate 
adjustment. If we assume rational investors, the expected rate of inflation may be proxied by 
actual rates experienced in each country. For the rational investor actual inflation is equal to 
expected inflation plus a random forecast error (with zero mean). Under the assumption of 
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rational expectations therefore, the real required rate of return on government stock may be 
obtained by using the actual inflation rate and the nominal required rate of return in the 
following way: 
or equivalently in logs6 
(3.12) 
where 1t = actual inflation rate, In = natural logarithms. 
The real required rate of return, however, still contains two components, the risk-free 
rate and the liquidity premium, so how can the time value of money be obtained from this? 
The liquidity of short-term assets, as has been argued earlier in Section n, is much greater than 
it is for longer-term assets and so, by considering short-term government assets such as 
Treasury bills, only a very small liquidity premium will be required by investors which can 
be assumed to be the same across countries. 
The risk-free rate, therefore, will be measured by using the rate Treasury bills in each 
country, or a rate on a proxy instrument as close as possible to Treasury bills7 and will be 
calculated as follows: 
6 Natural logarithms have been used 10 allow the continuous compounding of interest rates over time. 
7 See Appendix for data description. 
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(3.13) 
where rib = real Treasury bill rate. 
ii) Test 2: The Liquidity Premium 
Of key interest to this study is how investors in each country behave over the longer 
term and so the next step is to consider a longer investment horizon. In considering the 
estimation of rf in the previous section Treasury bills were to be used so that the liquidity 
premium could be assumed to be equal to zero. The liquidity premium measures the reward 
each particular group of investors requires to induce them to invest in a long-term, risk-free 
(in terms of default risk) asset over a short-term, risk-free asset and so will be defined here as 
the difference between the long-term asset and the risk-free rate. Since we now have an 
estimation ofrfit becomes possible to evaluate the size of the liquidity premium required by 
investors in the various countries with the use of a longer term asset. 
The liquidity premium, A, will be obtained using the Treasury bill rate (r ~ and the yield 
on long-term government bonds. The yield on government bonds is used because this is a 
forward- looking measure and is representative of the internal rate of return of holding the 
bond to maturity, i.e. the discount rate used to calculate the present value of the bond. 
The price of a bond at a particular point in time is the discounted value of all future 
income, i.e. coupon payments and redemption payments: 
(3.14) 
where Pb = bond price, Cl..n = coupon payments, r = required rate of return! discount rate 
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The yield to maturity of a bond shows the average yield of the bond per annum if held 
to maturity. It may be described as the single interest rate that equates the present value of the 
future payments to the bond's price, or r in the above equation. In other words the yield to 
maturity on a bond may be interpreted as the internal rate of return or rate of discount on that 
bond. 
The yield on government bonds will therefore be used as a measure of the required rate 
ofretum of investors in long-term risk-free assets and will be compared with the risk-free rate 
on Treasury bills to obtain a liquidity premium. Recalling equation 3.4 the liquidity premium 
combines with the risk-free rate as follows 
where rb is the yield on long-term government bonds. This gives a liquidity premium, A, 
The liquidity premium will be calculated in logarithmic terms as the yield on long-term 
government bonds minus the risk-free rate, 
(3.15) 
The liquidity premium calculated in equation (3.14) is a nominal premium~ as inflation 
increases, the purchasing power of this premium will be reduced. Using a similar 
methodology to that used to deflate the risk-free series, a real liquidity premium, A ., may be 
calculated as 
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(3.16) 
Hi) Test 3: The Eguity Risk Premium 
A further potential cause of the denominator effect and hence of 'general' short-
termism is the equity risk premium. This risk premium may be described as the rate of return 
investors expect to obtain from an equity investment in excess of that which they expect from 
a risk-free asset. It is the extra reward investors require to compensate them for the additional 
risk involved in equity investment rather than risk-free investment such as Treasury bills. The 
third test will therefore be to calculate and compare the size of the equity risk premium across 
the five countries. 
Recalling equation 3.6 
from which a premium may be calculated as follows 
The equity risk premium will be calculated by comparing real rates of return on equity 
and the risk-free series from Test 1 as follows: 
(3.17) 
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In a similar manner to the liquidity premium, the value of the equity premium will be 
eroded by the presence of inflation and so a real equity risk premium should be calculated as 
(3.18) 
The calculations outlined above allow us to establish whether the equity risk premium 
is higher in the UK than elsewhere. The fmding of a higher equity risk premium may indicate 
either a rational response by investors to higher risk levels, or the requirement by investors 
of a greater reward for a given risk level, compared to investors elsewhere. In order to try and 
ascertain which of these above explanations is correct, the price of risk will be calculated for 
each country. The price of risk may be calculated as the equity risk premium divided by the 
standard deviation of real equity returns. 
(3.19) 
Whilst it is of interest to know which is the correct explanation for the existence of a 
high risk premium, it should be noted that whichever of these explanations are valid, the 
outcome is the same; firms face a denominator effect and hence a greater discount rate which 
reduces the number of projects with a positive net present value. 
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IV) RESULTS 
i) Test 1: The Time Value of Money 
The purpose of Test 1 is to test for the presence of "true" short-term ism, that is, to 
examine the assertion that certain groups of investors and, in particular UK investors, have a 
high time value of money. The basis of this test is to compare the risk-free rate earned by 
investors in each of five countries studied with the risk-free rate being measured by the 
Treasury bill rate or a rate on a proxy instrument as close as possible to Treasury bills. 8 
The results for Test 1 are presented in Tables 3.1a and 3.1b with the plots of the 
relevant series shown in Figures 3.1 & 3.2.9 
Table 3.1a: Real Treasury Bill Returns (1975 to 1995:6) 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
UK 
1.638 
4.901 
BD 
2.995 
1.832 
9See Appendix for a description of this data. 
IOSee Appendix for Figures. 
JP 
2.353 
2.136 
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FR us 
2.857 1.485 
3.209 2.474 
Table 3.1b: Testing for Difference Between Means (1975 to 1995:6) 
t -sta tistic 
UK& 
Germany 
-4.060* 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 5% level. 
UK& 
Japan 
-2.093* 
UK& 
France 
-3.258* 
UK& 
US 
0.435 
As can be seen in the Tables 3.1a and b, the mean real returns are highest in Germany 
and lowest in the US. The UK returns are relatively low compared to the other countries in 
the sample with only US returns being lower. The differences found between the UK mean 
returns and the mean returns elsewhere were all significant except between the UK and US. 
It does not appear to be possible to group the countries according to the type of financial 
system present in a country with France having the second highest returns, Japan the third and 
the UK the fourth highest. The UK and US, countries typically associated with short-termism, 
do however appear to have lower rates of return than elsewhere. The standard deviations of 
real returns do allow such a grouping to be made with the capital-market-based group showing 
a greater deviation in returns. The lowest standard deviation was found in German real returns 
which is perhaps surprising given the high mean returns experienced in that country. From 
the above results on the real rate of return, therefore. the real returns received on UK Treasury 
Bills (risk-free rate) are significantly lower than the other countries studied, thus providing no 
evidence to suggest the presence of short-termism amongst UK investors. From the plots of 
the real Treaswy bill returns in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 it can be seen that the relationship between 
UK. real rates and those of the other countries in the sample is not consistent: during the period 
1975 to 1985 the UK real rate is much lower than elsewhere whereas over the period 1985 to 
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1995 the real rate is high relative to the other countries. As a result of these changes over 
time, the test was repeated using a subsample of the dataset from 1985 to 1995:6, the results 
of which are shown in Tables 3.2a and b.1O 
Table 3.2a: Real Treasury Bill Returns (1985 to 1995:6) 
UK BD JP FR 
Mean 4.544 3.810 3.163 5.377 
Standard 1.243 1.156 1.207 1.280 
Table 3.2b: Testing for Difference Between Means (1985 to 1995:6) 
t-statistic 
UK& 
Germany 
4.837* 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 5% level. 
UK& 
Japan 
8.913* 
UK& 
France 
-5.215* 
UK& 
US 
15.233* 
us 
2.055 
1.339 
In the subsample 1985 to 1995:6 France now has the highest mean real return with the 
UK, in contrast to the full sample results, having the second highest. The US does not 
however follow the rest of the capital-market-based group and still displays the lowest mean 
return despite its returns series being the most volatile. Germany, on the other hand, has a 
high mean return given the level of volatility in returns. All these differences are significant 
lOr -tests were carried out to test for a difference between the means of the two subsamples and the second 
period was found to have significantly higher mean real Treasury bill rates than the first period across all countries. 
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at the 5% level. II Therefore, there is evidence to suggest that short-tennist behaviour was 
present among UK and French investors during the period January 1985 to June 1995. 
Although there is conflicting evidence regarding the presence of short-tennism in the 
UK, depending on the time period under consideration, the lack of a consistent relationship 
can in itself support the hypothesis of no short-tennism. The evidence suggests that investors 
do not consistently require a higher rate of return and, therefore, cannot be said to be 
consistently more short-tennist than other investors. 
In conclusion, the UK displays a relatively low time value of money over the period 
1975 to June 1995 thus not supporting the hypothesis that the UK exhibits short-term 
behaviour. In the sub-period 1985 to June 1995, however, real rates of return were 
significantly higher in the UK than in the other countries, with the exception of France, and 
hence this may be taken as being representative of a high time value of money. This high time 
value of money in turn provides some SUPPOlt for the assertion that UK investors display short-
term behaviour. 
An alternative explanation for the observed pattern in real interest rates is the incorrect 
anticipation of inflation by UK investors. The high inflation rates experienced in the UK 
during the 1970s may reasonably have been underestimated by investors, leading to lower real 
interest rates. Following these high inflation rates, and the resultant low real rates ofretum, 
investors may have become cautious when estimating inflation, requiring longer periods of 
lower inflation before deflating their expectations accordingly. This overestimation of 
liThese results hold when the sample period is extended to start in 1980 with the exception that the German 
mean return is now higher, but not significantly so, than that of UK, hence showing the influence of the period 1975 
to 1980 in the full dataset from 1975 to 1995:6. 
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inflation would lead to higher real interest rates. 
Some support for this explanation of the pattern of real interest rates in the UK may 
be seen by comparing UK and US real interest rates. The real interest rates received by US 
investors were generally higher than those received by UK investors during the 1970s and 
generally lower than UK investors during the 1980s (see Figure 3.2). This pattern in real 
interest rates may be linked to inflation levels over the relevant time periods. The lower 
inflation rates experienced in the US during the 1970s (see Figure 3.10) could result in US 
investors being less likely to underestimate inflation rates over this period and hence less 
likely to overestimate inflation during the 1980s. Even though the high rea] interest rates may 
be explained by the lagged adjustment of inflation expectations this will still result in firms 
facing a higher discount rate. That is, the denominator effect created by the incorrect 
anticipation of inflation produces the same influence on investment appraisal as a higher time 
value of money on the part of investors. The explanation of the higher real interest rates is 
important, however, for any policy aimed at reducing short-term pressures in the capital 
market. If the inflation expectations argument does correctly explain the pattern of real 
interest rates, then this implies policy should be aimed at macroeconomic stability rather than 
reducing investors' time value of money. The suggestion that the incorrect anticipation of 
inflation may explain the pattern of real interest rates questions the validity of the rational 
expectations assumption. Further research could usefully explore alternative theories of 
expectation formation. One approach to the difficulties encountered with the assumption of 
rational expectations will be presented in Chapter 4. 
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ii) Test 2: The Liquidity Premium 
Test 1 gave a basic insight into the time value of money of investors by looking at the 
risk-free rate in the sample countries. In addition to this, it is also important, in the context 
of looking for evidence of short-termism, to consider how the investors in each country behave 
over the longer term. This test will be carried out using long-term government bonds. Of 
particular concern in this test is the premium investors require to undertake investment over 
the long-term rather than the short-term. Consequently, this test will compare international 
liquidity premiums where the liquidity premium is calculated as the excess return on a long-
term government bond over the risk-free rate. 
The relative yields on long-term bonds are of interest in themselves as a measure of 
the rate of return required by investors over the longer term and so the long-term government 
yields will be examined first before going on to consider the liquidity premium (see Tables 
3.3aand b). 
Table 3.3a: Real Bond Returns (1976:3 to 1995:6) 
UK BD JP FR US 
i) 1976:3 to 1995:6 
Mean 3.041 4.095 3.176 4.074 3.392 
Standard 3.078 1.289 1.767 2.173 2.814 
Deviation 
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Table 3.3b: Testing for Difference Between Means (1976:3 to 1995:6) 
t-statistic 
Notes: see Table 3.lb. 
UK& 
Germany 
-4.798* 
UK& 
Japan 
0.575 
UK& 
France 
-4.166* 
UK& 
US 
-1.278 
UK investors in long-term government bonds receive the lowest mean return on their 
investment whilst German investors receive the highest mean return. The UK mean return is 
significantly lower than the mean returns of France and Germany but is not significantly 
different from the others. From these results therefore, it can be seen that even over the long-
term investors do not require higher returns than elsewhere and so this second test also finds 
no evidence to support the assertion that UK. investors exhibit short-termism. In terms of the 
financial system present in each country no obvious grouping appeared with the lowest returns 
being in the UK. and Japan which, as discussed in Chapter 2, have greatly differing financial 
systems. Further evidence against the importance of the financial system was that the 
difference in returns between the UK and Japan was not found to be significant. 
From the plots of real bond returns in Figures 3.3 & 3.4, it can be seen that the returns 
from the early 1980s are in general higher than those of the over the earlier years in the sample 
and so the data for mean returns were again split into two sample periods as with the Treasury 
bill Data.12 The results for this time period may be seen in Tables 3.4a and b. 
12Tbe means for the second subsample were found to be significantly higher than for the earlier subsample 
across all countries. 
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Table 3.4a: Real Bond Returns (1985 to 1995:6) 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
UK 
4.283 
1.711 
BD JP 
4.494 3.531 
1.390 0.908 
FR 
5.592 
0.672 
Table 3.4b: Testing for Difference Between Means (1985 to 1995:6) 
t-statistic 
Notes: see Table 3.1 b. 
UK& 
Germany 
-1.071 
UK& 
Japan 
4.342* 
UK& 
France 
-7.958* 
UK& 
US 
-0.815 
us 
4.434 
1.167 
In the subsample starting January 1985 the UK"still displays a relatively low mean 
return on long-term bonds, having the second lowest returns with the lowest occurring in 
Japan. The UK's mean bond return, compared to the full dataset, has increased relative to the 
other countries in the sample such that it is now significantly higher than Japan and no longer 
significantly lower than any other country except France. !3 UK investors therefore receive the 
lowest real rate of return on government bonds over the full dataset and second lowest in the 
subsample from 1985 to June 1996. This again raises the question of whether real returns are 
low as a result of investor behaviour, or whether they are the result of incorrect anticipation 
of inflation. 
Using government bond and TreasUl)' bill series the liquidity premium was calculated 
i3With a starting point for the second period of 1980 the results are not changed substantially with France and 
Germany having significantly higher mean bond returns than UK and US at the 10010 level, whilst Japanese mean 
bond returns are still lower than the UK but now not significantly so. 
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for each country both in nominal and real terms and the results are presented in Tables 3.5a 
andb. 
Table 3.5a: Liquidity Premium (1976:3 to 1995:6) 
UK BD JP FR US 
i) Nominal Liquidity Premium 
Mean 0.588 0.858 0.586 0.835 1.640 
Standard 2.141 1.537 1.118 1.372 1.547 
Deviation 
ii) Real Liquidity Premium 
Mean -6.774 -2.307 -2.511 -5.354 -3.622 
Standard 4.906 2.896 2.862 3.462 4.254 
Deviation 
Table 3.5b: Testing for the Difference Between Means (1976:3 to 1995:6) 
UK& UK& UK& UK& 
Germany Japan France US 
i) Nominal Liquidity Premium 
t-statistic -1.557 0.011 -1.474 -6.053* 
ii) Real Liquidity Premium 
t-statistic -11.919* 19.611* -3.596* -7.378* 
The nominal liquidity premium is highest in the US, whilst the premium received by 
UK investors is the second lowest out of the five countries, but is only significantly lower than 
the liquidity premium received by US investors. The real liquidity premium is negative for 
all countries and lowest in the UK where the liquidity premium is significantly lower than the 
other four countries. The real liquidity premium is in general lower for the countries 
associated with capital-market-based financial systems. In summary, there is no evidence to 
suggest UK investors require a larger premium than elsewhere for investing over the longer 
79 
tenn and consequently no denominator effect has been identified. 
iii) Test 3: The Equity Risk Premium 
The final test is to compare the risk premium required by investors to be persuaded to 
invest in equity in each of the countries. The equity risk premium may be defined as the rate 
of return investors expect to obtain from equity in excess of that which they expect from the 
risk -free asset. The aim of the test is to ascertain whether UK investors require a higher 
premium for undertaking equity investment than elsewhere. In making international 
comparisons care must be taken when interpreting the results as any differences in returns may 
be due to differing risk levels across the countries. In addition to the mean equity returns of 
each country, volatility is also measured using standard deviation of returns to give an insight 
into the risk involved in equity investment in each of the five countries. 
The mean, standard deviations and tests for the differences between means of the real 
equity returns and risk premium series for each country are presented in Tables 3.6a and b 
with plots of the real equity return series in Figures 3.5 to 3.8. The highest mean rate of return 
on equity was found to be that of the UK followed by France, US, Gennany and Japan. This 
ranking of the mean returns allows a grouping of the countries according to financial systems 
with those of capitaJ-market-based systems being higher and those of bank-based countries 
being lower. These differences however are not statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 3.6a: Real Equity Returns (1975 to 1995:6) 
UK BD JP FR US 
i) Real Equity Returns 
Mean 12.429 6.737 5.336 9.463 8.470 
Standard 72.303 57.860 62.951 76.104 49.331 
Deviation 
ii) Nominal Equity Risk Premium 
Mean 10.792 3.742 2.983 6.606 6.985 
Standard 72.797 57.974 62.953 76.269 46.462 
Deviation 
iii) Real Equity Risk Premium 
Mean 2.165 0.368 -0.682 -0.113 1.362 
Standard 72.513 58.032 63.052 76.340 49.719 
Deviation 
Table 3.6b: Testing for the Difference Between Means 
UK& UK& UK& UK& 
Germany Japan France US 
i) Real Equity Returns 
t-statistic 0.962 l.158 0.442 0.708 
ii) Nominal Equity Risk Premium 
t-statistic 1.186 l.270 0.621 0.677 
iii) Real Equity Risk Premium 
t-statistic 0.303 0.464 0.339 0.143 
In relation to the volatility in equity returns Japan has a very low mean equity return 
whilst the US has a high mean return compared to its volatility in equity returns. Therefore, 
whilst the mean return on equity is higher in the VK than the other countries in the sample this 
81 
difference is not significant and so there is no evidence to support the assertion that UK 
investors in the equity market are more short-termist than investors in the other countries. 14 
The key part of this third test is a comparison of international equity risk premiums, 
the results of which are also presented in Tables 3.6a and b. The equity risk premium 
produces similar results to the equity returns in that there are no significant differences 
between the UK equity mean returns and mean returns elsewhere, for either nominal or real 
premiums. The UK, US and France display the highest nominal equity risk premium and 
Japan the lowest, however limited inferences can be drawn from these results due to the lack 
of significance. The real equity risk premium is also highest in the UK and US but France's 
premium is now lower than that of Germany, despite the French series being the most volatile. 
Even with relatively high inflation in the UK the real equity risk premium remains highest in 
the UK, though not significantly so. 
Throughout the analysis of equity returns and premiums Japanese investors receive a 
Iow return given the standard deviation in the relevant series. In contrast the US investors 
receive a high mean return relative to the level of standard deviation. In the UK the mean 
returns to investors are higher but so is the level of volatility as measured by the standard 
deviation of returns, therefore suggesting that the higher mean return may be associated with 
higher risk. To examine this issue further the price of risk has been calculated as the return 
to an asset over a given period divided by the standard deviation in returns to that asset over 
the period. The results ofthis calculation are shown in Table 3.7a and b. 
14From observation of the series in Figures 3.5 to 3.8 there is no clear split over time as with the other series 
so the sample was not divided into two sub-periods for further analysis. 
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Table 3.7a: Mean Price of Equity Risk (1975 to 1995:6) 
UK BD JP FR us 
Mean 1.421 1.141 1.505 1.305 . 1.165 
Table 3.7b: Testing for the Difference Between Means (1975 to 1995:6) 
t-statistic 
UK& 
Germany 
0.515 
UK& 
Japan 
-0.146 
UK& 
France 
0.199 
UK& 
US 
0.494 
Table 3.7a shows that the mean price of risk has been relatively high in the UK 
compared to Germany, France and the US but is lower than that of Japan. These differences 
are not, however, statistically significant and so the inferences which can be drawn from these 
results are limited. The results shown in Tables 3.7a and 3.7b are perhaps surprising given 
previous observations. This discrepancy may possibly be explained by the method of 
calculation of the various measures: the results in the earlier tables are produced by monthly 
figures whilst the mean price of risk is based on daily data. It is possible that the daily data 
has a large amount of variance even though on a month to month basis there is little variation 
in returns. 
V) CONCLUSION 
To obtain a workable and testable definition, short-term ism has been defined as the 
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use of a high discount rate. By decomposing the discount rate into its individual components 
it became possible to further divide this definition into "true" short-term ism, where the 
investor has a high time value of money, and "general" short-termism, which refers to the use 
of a high discount rate resulting from any of the other components of the discount rate. On 
the basis of these definitions three tests were carried out the first aimed at measuring the time 
value of money; the second at measuring the liquidity premium and the third at measuring the 
equity risk premium. 
Test 1 is a test for the presence of "true" short-termism i.e. tests whether the risk-free 
rate is higher in the UK than elsewhere. On examination of the full dataset, 1975 to 1995, no 
evidence was found to suggest the presence of short-termism amongst UK investors. Inde~d 
UK investors exhibited relatively low returns to the risk-free asset thereby suggesting the 
converse of short-term behaviour. These results were however found to be sensitive to the 
time period considered and the omission of the high inflation period of the late 1970s resulted 
in a relatively high real rate of return for UK investors, with only French investors receiving 
a higher return. Therefore, in contrast to the longer time period there is evidence to suggest 
the presence of "true" short-termism over this period. Although evidence of short-termism has 
been found, due to the conflict of results over time, UK investors cannot be said to be 
consistently short-termist in their investment behaviour. An alternative explanation for the 
pattern of real rates of return is a lagged adjustment on the part of investors with respect to 
inflation expectations. For example, during the 1970s it seems reasonable that investors did 
not expect such high inflation rates, therefore underestimating future inflation and resulting 
in lower real rates of return. During the 1980s however investors may have become cautious 
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and required much more persuasIon to deflate their inflation expectations, hence 
overestimating inflation and requiring higher real rates of return. Whilst recognising this 
alternative explanation for the pattern of real interest rates, it was noted that whatever the 
reason for a real rate of return, firms still face a high discount rate. The reason behind a real 
rate of return is, however, important for policy decisions as it implies the emphasis of policy 
should be on macroeconomic stability. It was also noted that the problems encountered with 
inflation expectations do suggest difficulties with the rational expectations assumption. As 
a result the following chapter will carry out analysis into short-termism allowing the rational 
expectations assumption to be relaxed. Over the longer term UK investors receive relatively 
Iow returns requiring a low premium for investing over the longer term. The liquidity premium 
in the UK was not significantly different from those received in the other countries apart from 
the US whose returns were higher than those in the UK. In real terms the UK liquidity 
premium was significantly lower than in the other countries. The results produced by the 
comparison of international equity markets show that the returns are close in value. Although 
the returns in the UK were relatively higher the other countries, any differences found either 
between the returns themselves or equity risk premiums were not statistically significant. 
Similar results were obtained by the comparison of the price of risk in equity markets across 
countries. 
In summary, on the basis of these tests there is little evidence, given our assumptions, 
to suggest short-termism, as represented by a denominator effect, exists. If short-term ism is 
present anywhere it is in the form of "true" short-termism as indicated by the presence of a 
high risk-free rate of return, or time value of money, and has occurred during the 1980s and 
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early 1990s. 
With regards to the second hypothesis under consideration; whether or not differences 
exist between investors in countries with capital-market-based systems and those with bank-
based systems, no discernible pattern could be identified. No pattern could be readily 
identified in risk-free rate ofretum except that when considering the full dataset the returns 
in the UK and the US were lower than the returns elsewhere. This relationship was not 
however maintained when using only the shorter time period 1985 to June 1996. The results 
obtained from the bond market were very mixed giving no further insight into the possible 
grouping of countries according to financial systems. In the equity market analysis, higher risk 
premiums were found, both in real and nominal tenns, in capital-market-based financial 
systems, but these returns were not significantly higher than the other countries. 
Given evidence to suggest "true" short-termism may exist, at least over the 1980s 
, 
further empirical examination of the time value of money ofUK investors is required. The 
aim of the following chapter is to consider in more detail the Treasury bill rate of return in 
each country and look for any systematic differences. A key part of Chapter 4 will be to relax 
the assumption of a zero exchange risk premium, which has been made in the analysis so far, 
in order to ascertain whether any differences found in real rates of return are due to the 
presence of such a premium. In this chapter ex post interest rates have been used under the 
assumption of rational expectations. The following chapter will relax this assumption and so 
will introduce ex ante interest rates. 
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APPENDIX 
A) DATA 
i) Treasury Bill Data 
In the United Kingdom, United States and France 3-month Treasury Bill rates were 
used. In Germany, were difficulties were encountered in obtaining Treasury Bill data the 
money market rate was used. Although there are short-term government bills in Japan, the 
interest rate on these bills is determined at an artificially low rate and therefore the market has 
been insignificant. The Japanese series will therefore be constructed using the call money rate 
until February 1977 and thereafter the Gensaki rate. All data was monthly and in the form of 
period averages. 
ii) Government Bond Yield 
Data for long-term government stocks were collected from Datastream and were as 
follows: 
i) United Kingdom- gross redemption yield on 20 year gilts. 
ii) Germany- yield on 2nd market public bonds, 7 to 15 years. 
iii) Japan- yield on government benchmark bonds, 8 to 10 years. 
iv) France-yield on government bonds on secondary market, over 7 years. 
v) United States-yield on treasury bonds, 10 years or more. 
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iii) Equity Market Data 
Total return indices were collected from Datastream International for each country and 
were constructed of the price appreciation of stocks plus reinvested dividends. 
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B) FIGURES 
Figure 3.1: Real Rate of Return on Treasury BilIs- UI(, Germany & Japan 
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Figure 3.2: Real Rate of Return on Treasury Bills- UK, France & US. 
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Figure 3.3: Real Rate of Return on Long-term Government Bonds 
- UJ{, Germany & Japan. 
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Figure 3.4: Real Rate of Return on Long-term Government Bonds 
- UJ{, France & US. 
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Figure 3.5: Real Rate of Return on Equity- UK & Germany. 
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Figure 3.6: Real Rate of Return on Equity- UK & Japan. 
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Figure 3.7: Real Rate of Return on Equity- UK & France. 
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Figure 3.8: Real Rate of Return on Equity- UK & US. 
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Figure 3.9: Inflation Rates- UK, Germany & Japan. 
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Figure 3.10: Inflation Rates- UK, France & US. 
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CHAPTER 4: FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF "TRUE" SHORT -TERMISM 
I) INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter evidence was found to suggest that if short-termism does exist 
it is in the form of "true" short-termism, as indicated by the presence of a higher risk-free real 
rate of return, rather than more general short-term ism in the form of higher liquidity or equity 
risk premiums. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide further empirical investigation into the potential 
presence of "true" short-termism in UK capital markets. This will involve considering the 
time value of money in more detail by further analysing international real interest rates and 
looking for any systematic differences across countries. The analysis will include relaxing the 
rational expectations assumption made in the previous chapter. The impact of this will be 
two-fold; firstly, the absence of rational expectations in the foreign exchange market will 
allow the existence of an exchange rate risk premium, and secondly, it will no longer be 
assumed that ex ante and ex post interest rates differ only by a random error. The exchange 
rate risk premium is of interest, not only as a possible explanation for international interest 
rate differences, but also as a component of the total discount rate, and is therefore a potential 
cause of "general" short-termism. In order to be able to relax the rational expectations 
assumption, the chapter will include the derivation of both ex ante real interest rates and ex 
ante exchange volatility using the methodology of Mishkin (1 984a,b ) and Generalised 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity models respectively. 
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The chapter will be organised as follows: section 1I will outline a method of testing for 
the presence of short-termism~ section III outlines the econometric methodology to be used 
covering the measurement of ex ante real interest rates, exchange rate volatility and tests for 
evidence of short-termism. Section IV presents the empirical results and a discussion of these 
results with the final section, V, offering a summary and conclusion. 
11) TESTING FOR EVIDENCE OF SHORT-TERMISM 
Having found some evidence in the previous chapter to suggest that real risk-free rates 
of return are not equal across countries it will be useful to try and explain why such 
differences exist. One explanation, as discussed in Chapter 3, is that the time value of money 
of investors differs from country to country. An alternative explanation which may be put 
forward is the existence of an exchange rate risk premium. Frankel and McArthur (1988) 
argue that almost all studies testing parity conditions assume investors form rational 
expectations of future exchange rates such that expected and actual exchange rates differ by 
only a random expectational error with mean zero, as was assumed in Chapter 3. Using this 
methodology previous studies, such as Cumby and Obstfeld (1984), generally reject the 
hypothesis that the nominal interest differential is an unbiased estimator of exchange rate 
changes and interpret these findings as a rejection of Uncovered Interest Parity. Frankel and 
McArthur go on to offer the exchange risk premium as a prime candidate to explain 
international inequalities in expected real rates of return. The exchange risk premium is 
required whenever foreign and domestic assets are not perfect substitutes, assuming risk 
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averse investors. 
In Chapter 3, the discount rate was decomposed into its various components, namely 
the time value of money, the inflation adjustment, the liquidity premium, the risk premium 
and the exchange rate risk premium. On the assumption of rational expectations in the foreign 
exchange market. and hence a zero exchange rate risk premium, the rate of return on Treasury 
bills was argued to be equal to the time value of money of investors i.e. the risk-free rate. 
However, if an exchange rate risk premium is present then this will be reflected in the rate of 
return on Treasury bills. This Chapter aims to develop the preceding analysis by decomposing 
the return to Treasury bills into the following components: a basic required rate of return ex, 
exchange rate risk X and a residual term E. I The basic rate of return refers to the investors' 
time value of money. that is. how much investors require as a reward in return for forgoing 
present consumption. 
Real rates of return on Treasury bills will be compared using the following model 
(4.1) 
where rit is the rate of return on Treasury bills for country i in time period 1. The null 
hypothesis to be tested is that the basic rate of return, (X i> required by investors is the same for 
each country: any departures from this, i.e. significantly different (X jvalues, may be interpreted 
as behavioural differences on the part of investors and, in particular a higher (Xi may be 
interpreted as evidence of "true" short-termism. Use of the formulation in equation 4.1 also 
allows the hypothesis of whether or not an exchange rate risk premium exists to be tested. 
I It is assumed here that default risk and inflation risk are close to or equal to zero as explained in Chapter 3. 
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This chapter will therefore test for the presence of short-tennism in UK capital markets 
by firstly decomposing the discount rate into two components : the basic required rate of 
return of investors and an exchange rate risk premium. Following this decomposition the 
components win be compared across countries with a higher basic rate of return being 
indicative of "truel1 short-tennism whilst a higher exchange rate risk premium is indicative of 
"general" short-tennism. 
IIIl ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
i) Measuring Real Interest Rates 
From the Fisher equation (1930), also known as closed interest parity, it is 
hypothesised that real interest rates can be separated into two components as shown in 
equation (4.2) below; 
Rt = r t + 1r:~ (4.2) 
where ~ denotes the nominal rate of interest on an asset, rt is the real rate of interest and 1t et 
the expected inflation rate, where 1t t= E( 1t tl I,-J. Et is the mathematical expectations operator 
and It is the information set. In other words, the real return can be described as the nominal 
interest rate less expected inflation. The relationship above can be distinguished from the ex 
post formulation 
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(4.3) 
or 
(4.4) 
where rpt = ex post real rate ofretUIll, 1tt = the actual inflation rate and Et = the forecast error 
Real rates of return can therefore be expressed in two ways: ex ante or ex post, both 
of which will be used in this chapter. The ex post real rates of return will be the same 
Treasury bill series used in the previous chapter. Ex ante real interest rates are also of interest 
here as these show the rate of return investors can 'expect from an investment and, 
consequently, may give an insight into the investors' required rate of return. Unfortunately, 
in contrast to ex post real rates, ex ante real interest rates are not directly observable. Mishkin 
(1 984a,b ) and Cumby and Mishkin (1986) suggest an econometric methodology to overcome 
these difficulties and this methodology will be used here to estimate ex ante real interest 
2 An alternative approach would be to form inflation expectations using survey data and to subtract this from 
the nominal interest rate (see Lahiri & Zaporowski (1988), Peek and Wilcox (1983), Makin & Tanzi (1979) Levi 
& Makin (1979». The inflation expectation could be extracted from series such as the Carlson and Parkin series, 
Livingston series for the US and the Barclays Bank Quarterly series for the UK. There are a number of drawbacks 
associated with this approach both in theoretical and practical terms. Mishkin (1981) argues that the behaviour of 
market expectations may not reflect the average expectations of the participants in that market. The rationality of 
market expectations is not based on the belief that all, most, or even the average market participant is rational but 
rather arises from market expectations being driven to the rational expectations equilibrium by the elimination of 
unexploited profit opportunities. On a more practical level Mishkin argues there is little incentive for the survey 
respondents to answer accurately. Furthermore Copeland and Levin (1992) highlight the difficulty of matching 
survey data dates with events in the markets, making it almost impossible for the information set on which 
expectations are actually conditioned to be isolated, and also question the accuracy of such an approach. 
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A key assumption in this methodology is the rationality of inflation expectations in the 
bond market. This assumption, and the associated assumption of efficient financial markets 
has been supported by a large amount of evidence, incl uding tests of rationality of inflation 
forecasts in the bond market (Mishkin 1983). The assumption of rational expectations is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the rationality of ex ante real interest rates and further 
implies that the ex ante real interest rate is equal to the expected ex post real interest rate, 
(4.5) 
where Tt = real rate determined at time t-l and ((>t-1 is the information available at time t-1. 
Similarly, expected inflation is equal to the expectation of actual inflation given the 
information available at time t-l and implies the inflation forecast error is zero, 
1t~ • E(1ttlwt_1) 
E( Et I W .. 1) .. 0 (4.6) 
The set of all available information ((>t-1 is difficult to observe but this may be 
overcome by the use of a subset of the information set, denoted ~-b which includes 
observable variables correlated with the ex ante real interest rate. If the real rate is correlated 
with variables, Xt_I' a linear projection of rt given the subset of available information Xt_1 can 
be used 
(4.7) 
with the projection equation for rt 
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(4.8) 
where ~ = rt - P( rtl~_l ) and P = vector of coefficients; P( ~I~-l )= 0 by the law of iterated 
projections and so ~ is orthogonal to XI_I' 
The assumption of rational expectations also implies that the forecast error of inflation 
Et is uncorre1ated with any infonnation available at time t, including ~-1 and therefore, Et is 
orthogonal to ~-1' allowing consistent estimates by OLS. 
Although rt is not observable, ex ante real interest rates may still be estimated by using 
observable ex post real rates as follows (obtained by substituting (4.8) in to (4.4)). 
rpt = Xt-I ~ + Ut - et (4.9) 
Ex ante real interest rates are estimated by the fitted values of the OLS regression3 
(4.10) 
The contrast between results achieved using ex post and ex ante measures is important 
as it allows an assessment to be made of the validity of the rational expectations assumption 
made in the previous chapter. 
3Whilst this methodology a~oids problems encountered in other approaches, such as the use of survey data, it 
should be noted however that some concems have been expressed about the use of such an approach. Firstly, the 
information set used to create the ex ante interest rate series will not necessarily be the same as that available to the market 
at the time. This is particularly true when the information set incluldes data from the whole sample period to model 
expectations held at earlier dates (Copeland and Levin, 1992). Secondly, Summers (1993, p212-3) argues that the error 
, term is likely to be correlated with expected inflation because expected inflation and short-term interest rates respond to 
the same underlying economic forces. A key part of future work would be to develop a methodology overcoming these 
difficulties. 
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Choice of Variables for the Information set Xt_1 
The regressions carried out by Mishkin (1984a) are composed of four lags of the 
domestic inflation rate, one lag of domestic money growth CM1). the nominal euro rate and 
a fourth order time polynomial. Mishkin identifies several advantages of the time variable. 
The time variable may be thought of as a proxy for the smoothly moving (low frequency) 
component of economic variables that are related to real rates. This variable has been found 
to have significant explanatory power, while using up few degrees of freedom. Cumby & 
Mishkin (1986) include a constant term, time trend, nominal interest rate and three lags of 
inflation in their subset of information Xt_I' Money growth variables were also considered as 
part of the information set but were found to add no significant explanatory power and were 
consequently omitted from the final regression. A similar methodology was used by Mark 
(1985) in a study of interest rate differentials with the following used as components of Xt-I: 
current and past real interest differentials and rates of monetary growth and inflation at home 
and abroad. Current and past interest differentials are likely to provide information about 
future differentials and the inflation rates represent one component of the real interest 
differential. In the event that liquidity effects are present, the behaviour of monetary variables 
may be important. Mark (op. cit) also includes a linear time trend and twelve seasonal 
dummies. In a study or. real interest rates themselves rather than differentials, Blundell-
WignaU and Browne (1991) include the following variables in the subset of information: a 
constant term, a time trend, current nominal interest rates, three lags of inflation, one period 
lagged values of money and output growth. 
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ii) Exchan&e Rate Volatility 
It has been stated that a key development of this chapter will be to relax the 
assumption of rational expectations in the foreign exchange market, i.e. a zero exchange rate 
risk premium will no longer be assumed. By introducing exchange rate volatility it will be 
possible to establish how much of the risk-free rate, if any, can be attributed to rewards for 
exchange rate risk. 
a) Ex Ante Measure of Exchange Rate Volatility 
To estimate exchange rate volatility the variance in exchange rates will be used and 
of particular interest will be the ex ante variance. The reason ex ante exchange rate volatility 
is preferable is that it captures the uncertainty facing an investor. It is an investor's 
expectations of future risk which are important rather than the past (although these past 
realisations are likely to influence future expectations). It is the expectation of future 
volatility in a returns series, i.e. the risk, which will determine the size of the premium 
investors will require: assuming risk averse investors, the greater the risk, the larger the 
premium required. 
In general, financial markets are characterised by the following features: volatile 
returns; time-varying volatility of returns and the clustering of this volatility over time. Such 
features have been found to exist in foreign exchange markets with Mussa (1979) describing 
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time-varying volatility as an empirical regularity of exchange rate behaviour. According to 
Mandelbrot (1963, p418): 
"[L]arge changes [in speculative asset prices] tend to be followed by large changes ... of 
either sign ... and small changes tend to be followed by small changes •••• " 
The evidence of research into the nature of exchange rate returns is that the conditional 
distribution of returns cannot be assumed to be constant over time, thus suggesting that 
traditional econometric techniques may not be valid. In traditional econometric time series 
models the conditional variance of a series is assumed to be constant. This has important 
implications in the analysis of financial markets where the variance forms a fundamental part 
of finance models: if the variance of a series remains constant then this must imply constant 
risk, and therefore, a constant risk premium. Clearly then~ only when this assumption may be 
said to be valid for financial markets will the traditional models be valid. The assumption of 
constant conditional variance has been questioned by Perry (1982), Pindyck (1984) and 
Poterba and Summers (1986). Hsieh (1988) considers daily exchange rate data finding that the 
conditional distributions of nominal returns are changing through time. This result is also 
supported by Milhoj (1987), Diebold (1988), Diebold and Nerlove (1989) and Mussa (1979) 
"[F]or many exchange rates, there appear to be periods of quiescence in which day-to-
day and week-to-week movements are very small, and periods of turbulence in which 
day-to-day moveIllents are large." 
(Mussa, 1979, pll-12) 
Concerns have also been expressed about two further assumptions which are often 
required to be made: firstly that returns are independent and secondly, that the process 
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generating the returns series is linear in which the parameters are independent of past 
realisations ofthe process. Neftci (1984) argued that there was no reason to assume that these 
two conditions held given the workings of speculative markets, which suggest that non-
Iinearities and inter-temporal dependence in returns series are to be expected. Akgiray(l989) 
also presents evidence which is not consistent with the assumptions of independence and 
linearity. Conditionally heteroscedastic residuals have been found in both time series and 
structural models of spot exchange rates (see Cumby and Obstfeld, 1984, Domovitz and 
Hakkio,1985,Hsieh,1989,Engle,ItoandLin,1990). 
Further problems may arise involving the assumption of conditional normality. There 
is evidence to suggest exchange rate returns are leptokurtotic especially in the case of daily 
or weekly data (see McCurdy and Morgan, 1987, Milhoj, 1987, Hsieh, 1989, Baillie and 
Bollerselev, 1989, Friedman and Vandersteel, 1982). 
In summary, exchange rate movements may be described in terms of contiguous 
periods of volatility and stability together with leptokurtotic distributions (BolIerslev et al 
1992). Given these features offoreign exchange movements, many researchers have modelled 
exchange rate returns using autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) models, a 
survey of which is given in Bollerslev et al (1992). The ARCH model is a non-linear approach 
which may be considered to be appropriately applied to financial markets on the assumption 
of a non-linear dependen?e between risk and return. 
In the ARCH model as outlined by Engle (1982), the conditional variance is no longer 
assumed to be constant as in traditional time series models but is, instead, modelled as a 
function of past squared errors. 
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(4.11) 
(4.l2) 
(4.13) 
where Yt = return on asset, Et = disturbance term (white noise), ~ = conditional variance, Qt-l= 
information available at time (t-l). This model however does require certain restrictions to 
hold: firstly to ensure stability of the autoregressive process Y I has to be restricted such that 
0<Y1<1 and secondly, to ensure non-negative conditional variance, Yo and Yi have to be 
assumed to be positive. It is assumed that the distribution ofYt, conditional on information 
at time t-l, is normal with mean A 0 and variance ht. Any shock to the process will affect the 
residual term Et which will in turn affect the conditional variance, so that if the residual term 
increases then the variance ht will increase also. The extent of the impact of the residual term 
on variance will depend on the size of Y ~ the larger Y i the longer the effect of the shock will 
persist. 
However the ARCH model does present some disadvantages in that its lag structure 
lacks flexibility which has led to the development of Generalised Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models (Bollerslev 1986). In these models the conditional 
variance is expressed as a function not only of past squared errors, but also of past conditional 
variances. 
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GARCHModel 
(4.14) 
where p>O, q~ 0 and the following conditions are met Yo, Yi, Aj,~ 0, i=1..p,j=1..q. 
Given the nature of financial markets as described above the inclusion of past realised 
variances in the conditional variance is particularly relevant where the stability of the market 
varies over time. The conditional variance of the series {Yt} increases as past disturbances 
and/or past conditional variance increases and decreases as they decrease. 
The GARCH-M Model (GARCH in mean) 
The basic ARCH framework has been extended by Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987) 
so that the mean equation (eqn (4.11) of a series depends on its own conditional variance ht-
(4.15) 
Including htas a regressor implies that any change in the conditional variance, h" will 
be captured by the conditional mean of the return series {Yt}. Such an extension is of 
particular importance for financial markets due to the relationship between risk and return. 
Engle, Lilien and Robins assume that the risk premium is an increasing function of the 
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conditional variance, ht This implies that the greater the conditional variance of returns, the 
greater will be the compensation required to induce the agent to hold the long-term asset. 
Therefore, the exchange rate risk faced by investors will be measured by fitting a 
GARCH model to exchange rate data4 and extracting the conditional variance, ht • 
b) Ex Post Measure of Exchange Rate Volatility 
GARCH estimates ofthe variance of exchange returns and hence the risk involved in 
these returns have been calculated for the UK, Japan and France. This methodology, however, 
was not appropriate for the other countries under consideration, namely Germany and the US, 
where no evidence of ARCH effects was found (see Table 4.6). These countries, it will be 
remembered, are of particular interest for international comparison as they are good examples 
of a bank-based and capital-market-based system respectively. In order to overcome these 
difficulties and also to provide a contrast to the ex ante figures already estimated a measure 
of ex post volatility in exchange returns will also be used. 
The ex post volatility will be measured by the variance in exchange retunls during each 
month from March 1975 to June 1995. The variance of monthly exchange returns will be 
calculated using daily observations. S 
4Monthly observations on effective exchange rate series for five countries, UK, Japan, Germany, France and 
the US, were collected for the period January 1975 to June 1995 from Datastream mternational. The effective 
exchange rate series was selected as a means of providing a comparison between investing in the UT< and investing 
overseas generally. 
SThe effective exchange rate data used above was unfortunately not available on a daily basis so an alternative 
exchange rate dataset was collected which consisted of Bank of England trade-weighted indices. 
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Hi) Testing for Evidence of Short-Termism 
The basis of the test for evidence of short-tennism will be to compare the 
composition of the Treasury bill rate earned by investors in each of the countries studied. The 
Treasury bill rate it will be remembered from equation (4.1) can be described as follows: 
This means that, for an individual country, the Treasury bill rate will be equal to the basic 
required rate of return, lX, an exchange rate risk premium, X, and a residual term, E. Of 
particular importance to the issue of short-tennism is the basic return required by investors in 
each country. The component lX, through international aibitrage and in the absence of "true" 
short-tennism, should be equal across all countries, and consequently, any difference between 
the constant terms obtained for each country will be an indication of country specific 
differences in investor behaviour. The exchange rate volatility variable will provide an 
important insight into whether an exchange risk premium exists, and if so, to what extent it 
explains real interest differentials between countries. The exchange rate risk will be proxied 
by the volatility estimates obtained from GARCH models and also an ex post measure will be 
used. 
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IV) RESULTS 
i) Ex Ante Real Interest Rates 
The estimation results6 of equation 4.9 can be seen in Tables 4.1-4.5. The ~.l 
variables used for the UK consist of two lags of inflation, three lags of the nominal treasury 
bill rate and a fourth-order time polynomial. As can be seen in Table 4.1 all coefficients are 
significant except the third lag of the nominal interest rate. Whilst this variable is not 
significant its inclusion in the regression equation reduces autocorreIation in the residuals. 
Other variables were also considered such as seasonal dummies, money supply growth (MO) 
and further lags of inflation and Treasury bills, none of which however improved the 
explanatory power ofthe equation. 
The corresponding estimates for the Japanese data are presented in Table 4.2. The 
subset of information is here composed of two lags of inflation, one lag of the nominal interest 
rate and a fourth order time polynomial in time with all variables being significant at the 5% 
level. Again other variables were also considered such as money growth (Ml) and seasonal 
dummies, but were not found to improve the explanatory power of the equation. 
Table 4.3 presents the results for Germany which required a very small information 
set comprising only one lag of inflation and one lag of the nominal Treasury bill rate. These 
variables and the constant term were all found to be significant at the 5% level. The 
6These estimations were carried out using RATS. This is true of all estimations throughout this thesis unless 
otherwise stated. 
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introduction of further lags and variables, noticeably the fourth order time polynomial resulted 
in autocorrelated errors. 
The estimation of real rates of return for France and the US required much greater 
information sets mainly to overcome auto correlation problems, the results of which may be 
seen in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. The information set for France incorporates lagged inflation, a 
fourth-order time polynomial, lagged real Treasury bill rates, lagged nominal Treasury bill 
rates and the growth in money supply Ml. Of these variables, however, only the time variable, 
the second lag of the real and nominal Treasury bill rates were found to be significant. As can 
be seen from the Ljung-Box Q statistic, 52.412,. there is evidence that autocorrelation still 
remains. Further lags of the explanatory variables were not significant and their inclusion did 
not remove the autocorrelation. The US information set comprised of lagged values of the 
inflation, real Treasury bill rate and nominal Treasury bill rate series and a fourth-order time 
polynomial. Again it was not possible to remove all the autocorreIation by the inclusion of 
further lags which resulted only in insignificant coefficients. 
In summary, the key variables in the information sets were previous inflation 
rates, previous real Treasury bill rates and previous nominal Treasury bill rates. Also of 
importance was the fourth-order time polynomial used as a proxy for slow moving economic 
variables. This variable was found to be significant for all countries except Germany. The 
effect of the inclusion of a money supply variable, and hence the importance of liquidity 
effects, was considered for all countries. This variable was not however significant for any 
of the countries but was included in the French regression since its inclusion improved the 
explanatory power of the equation. 
llO 
Table 4.1: Real Interest Rate Regressions-UK 
........ , .. -
- .'-. ....... " .' 
:": .......... : .. :; 
,. .... ,", .... , 
.:",", ... ->':.~ ... "',' :- .. 
. "" ', .... - -.-. '"" , ..... ,'" 
.. -, .. 
1tt-t " ," '" : ,'t'Ol'm"e"""',·,'·,' ''''''' •. ' "·"'--it··"'b··t
_
t
>;'<>" 
-:~~::·::,:;'1tt_:.z . : ... ~.. " ~ - _ _: .-
: .. ,::. \~\:·:··.:·~··::>~.;:···:::~<.:··r·, 
.,_, h. ". ',. ,. , .• 
. ' : -'" '.;'. ~ . , 
.' '" " ..... " ... '"'" 
-." .. " .. 
,8.92-004* ' .. ' '. 8.93~004* .. 1.36* ,,' "'.',.,,0.387*« 
·(1.98~004»(7.35-002)«7.28~002) ' ••... ', '" ',", (6.76-005) 
" ~: .. . ,~·:<\:.·L;~· ;::-,:: .. ::.~ .::.': ", 
, , "';'2.82~004 
"«1.1O~004) 
< •••• :~,. ' •• :",":.::::: '~"> ':~:.~:.: >: .;~:;.\:.; .... ~:: .. 
Q(36} ",,'.,. 
- "....... ". . , " .'~'",.' .. " : F(6,234)· .',," ,'.",' 
"',,1588.699*, 
,"' .. :". (0000) : 
•• <,.. , 
;';0i;;,",;LL~~M I~~i:. p~,:L~I~2;~d~ ~~Wk ~'~H ~I~> 
nominal Treasury bill rate and It the current real Treasury bill rate. :', Figures, in parentheses under the OLS 
estimates are estimated standard errors whilst the figures under the Q statistic and the F statistic show the 
significance level..Q IS the Ljung-Box portmanteau statistic which is distributed as a X2 distribution and • 
denotes variables significant at the 5% leveLi 
111 
Table 4.2: Real Interest Rate Regressions-Japan 
Table 4.3: Real Rate Regressions-Germany 
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Table 4.4: Real Rate Regressions-France 
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Table 4.5: Real Rate Regressions- US 
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ii) Ex Ante Measure of Exchan2e Rate Volatility 
Following the evidence ofnon-linearities found in fmanciaI data in previous research, 
the first task was to test the data for such features in the dataset to be used, and so tests were 
carried out on exchange rate data' for the presence of autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity, the results of which can be seen in Table 4.6.8 
S ARCH tests were also carried out on the other data series to be used, the results of which are reported in 
the appendix. 
8These tests were carried out by regressing the effective exchange rate on a constant, saving the residuals, and 
then regressing the squared residuals from time period t on the squared residuals from previous time periods. 
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Table 4.6: Testing for ARCH Effects in Effective Exchange Rates 
. . . . 
········6073 
······· .. ·(O.299)i.·· ...• 
Evidence of ARCH effects in monthly exchange rate series was found for UK, Japan, 
and France. In the case of the UK there was evidence of ARCH effects up to ARCH(3). Japan 
displayed even stronger ARCH effects with the lagged residuals being significant up to six 
lags. France also showed high autoregressive conditional heteroscedastity, however the null 
hypothesis of no ARCH effects in the effective exchange rate series for Germany and the US 
could not be rejected. 
These results raise some interesting points: the results show that the exchange rate 
returns series vary in terms of structure from country to country. In the UK, Japan and France 
the residuals in previous time periods affect the residuaIs in the present time period whereas 
past residuals do not explain present residuals in the German and US series. It should also be 
115 
noted that these differences do not occur in accordance with the grouping of financial systems 
into bank- and capital-market-based systems. The findings of the tests are in contrast to 
previous work in this area. BailIie and BoIlerslev (1989) find that non-linearities are not 
typical of monthly or annual exchange rate data. While ARCH effects are highly significant 
with daily and weekly data, both Diebold (1988) and Baillie and BoIlerslev (1989) have noted 
that ARCH effects tend to weaken with less frequently sampled data. 
For those countries in which evidence of ARCH effects was found in exchange rate 
data, i.e. UK, Japan and France, exchange rate volatility will be estimated using ARCH-type 
methodology (Engle, 1982) as outlined earlier. The results from fitting GARCH and GARCH-
M (1,1) models to monthly effective exchange rate data for the UK,9 Japan 10 and France
" 
for 
the period January 1975 to June 1995 are shown in Table 4.7. 
9Higher order GARCH-M specifications were also tested as were GARCH and EGARCH models. The highest 
Log-likelihood functions were found using the GARCH(1,l) and GARCH-M (1,1), 877.310 and 877.497 
respectively. Although there was only a very small difference between the likelihood functions the GARCH-M 
specification was preferred since the GARCH model does not capture all the ARCH effects. The number of 
iterations required for the model to converge was26. 
10 Again other model specifications were tested but the GARCH-M (1,1) model was found to be the most 
appropriate. The GARCH-M model produced a log-likelihood function that was higher than those produced by 
the other models. Another important outcome of using the GARCH-M (1,1) specification was the lower 
autocorrelation present than in other models. Autocorrelation was however still present in the model chosen and 
consequently care should be taken when interpreting the results. The number of iterations taken for the model to 
converge was 39. 
IlAltemative models were also tested. By dropping the variance from the mean equation, i.e. by using a 
GARCH (1,1) model, a higher log likelihood function was achieved of 1031.358 with the coefficients on the lagged 
dependent variable A2, the intercept term Yo, and the coefficient on the lagged residuals y" all being significant. 
Whilst these results were an improvement on the GARCH-M model there was also evidence of autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity in the error terms. Also, the use of this model did not reduce the level of skew and 
kurtosis. Models of higher order specifications were also tried, both as GARCH and GARCH-M. but generally 
there was difficulty in achieving convergence, a low level of significance of variables, lower log likelihood 
functions and no reduction in skewness or kurtosis. The number of iterations taken for the model to converge was 
44. 
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Using UK data there is no evidence to suggest that an increase in the conditional 
variance of exchange returns is associated with movements in the conditional mean of 
exchange rate returns, i.e. the coefficient on the conditional variance in the mean equation 
(equation 4.15) is not significant. In the variance equation all three coefficients are significant 
indicating that the conditional variance in time period t is affected by both the conditional 
variance and residuals in time period (t·l). The conditional variance from time period (t·l) 
is highly significant in the variance equation showing the tendency ofvolatiIity to persist over 
time and also the tendency for there to be periods of quiescence and turbulence. Using 
Japanese data, the conditional variance is again not a significant variable in the determination 
of mean returns. The conditional variance in the previous time period is highly significant in 
the variance equation showing that persistence in volatility is also an important feature of 
Japanese exchange returns. The lagged residual term, however, was not signifcant in Japan 
in contrast to the UK result. The results of fitting a GARCH model to French data can also 
be seen in Table 4.7. From the results there is no evidence to suggest that an increase in the 
conditional variance of exchange returns is associated with movements in the conditional 
mean of exchange rate returns. The inclusion of the conditional variance in the mean equation 
did, however, reduce the ARCH effects in the errors. In the variance equation only the 
intercept term and the coefficient on past residuals are significant suggesting that past 
conditional variance does not affect present conditional variance. It should be noted that the 
model does present serious problems in terms of the amount of skewness and kurtosis present 
and, therefore, the results may be invalidated. 
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iii) Tests for Evidence of Short-Termism 
The results of the tests for evidence of short-termism in UK capital markets can be 
seen in Tables 4.8 to 4.11 where both ex ante and ex post series are used. 12, 13 The results 
obtained using ex post data for both series are shown in Table 4.8. 14 
The constant term, i.e. the basic level of return required by investors, is positive and 
significant at the 5% level for France and the US, but only at the 10% level for Germany 
andthe UK. The constant term obtained from the Japanese data was not significantly different 
from zero. The constant terms across countries are all similar and, in particular, the closeness 
between those of the UK and Germany should be noted. 15 The basic required return is lowest 
for US and German investors, and the highest in France. From these results it does not appear 
that the UK rate of return is high compared to the other countries studied. It may also be seen 
that no classification can be made of the financial systems into capital-market-based and bank-
based systems with respect to the basic rate of return investors require. 
IlUue to evidence ofheteroscedasticity found in the series (see Appendix) the standard errors quoted are 
robust standard errors. 
11 As can be seen in the Appendix, tests for stationarity could not always reject the presence of a unit root in 
the series used. As a result the regressions were also carried out in first differences. In terms of the ex post data 
this resulted in no significant variables except some lagged dependent variables and using ex ante data only the 
French exchange rate volatility variable was significant. 
14France: adding a third lag of the dependent variable reduced the significance of the Q-statistic to 0.00606, 
but only the first lag of the dependent variable was signficant. US: adding a fourth lag of dependent variable did 
not substantially improve the autocorrelation whilst the last two lags of the dependent variable were insignificant. 
15 Caution should be taken in the interpretation of these results as only the constant terms of France and US 
are significant at the 5% level. Autocorrelation problems were encountered with both the French and US data 
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Table 4.7: Maximum Likelihood Estimates ofGARCH(l,l) Model 
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The exchange rate risk premium is not significant for any of the countries studied showing 
generally low levels of significance. 16 The presence of an exchange rate risk premium would 
contribute to "general" short-termism and so the lack of evidence to support such a premium 
does not suggest the presence of short-termism amongst UK investors. The lack of support 
for an exchange rate risk premium suggests that the rational expectations assumption made 
in the previous chapter was a valid one to makel7, It also challenges the theory given by 
Frankel and MacArthur (1988) that such a premium can explain international interest rate 
differences. at least in the Treasury bill market. 
As has been noted the constant terms across the countries appear similar thus 
questioning the presence of short-termism in any of the countries. In order to examine this 
assertion more rigorously the analysis was repeated using a Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
approach. The preceding analysis considered the regression of five separate equations as 
shown in equation 4.16. 
rf,uk,t • a uk,t + J! X",k,t + e ut,t 
rf,bd,t = a bd,t + ~ Xbd,t + e bd,l 
rfJp,t = a Jp,t + ~ Xjp,f + e jp,t 
rfJr•1 = afr,t + P Xfr,t + efr,t 
rf,ul,t • alll,l + ~ XIII" + e 111.1 
(4.16) 
16 Due to the low levels of significance of the exchange rate volatility variable the regressions were rerun 
omitting this variable. The result of this was to increase the significance of the constant term to 5% for all 
countries. The ordering of the basic required rate of return is as follows: Japan, Germany, France, the UK and the 
US, where Japan is the highest. 
17The conclusions made here regarding the validity of the rational expectations assumption should be 
treated with caution. The evidence produced suggests only that the assumption of rational expectations mayor 
may not be valid in the particular context considered. There has been no attempt to provide a test of the 
Rational Expectations Hypothesis in more general terms. 
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Table 4.8: Tests for Evidence of Short-Termism 
Ex Post Real Interest Rates & Ex Post Exchange Rate Volatility 
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Under the assumption that real interest rates are not independent across countries, 
hence resulting in correlated error terms, the estimation of five single equations does not use 
all the available information, therefore producing inefficient estimates. To improve the 
efficiency of the estimation, Zellner(l962) suggested the equations should be regarded as a 
single large equation considering explicitly the possible presence of correlated error terms. 
This Seemingly Unrelated Regression approach will be used here and estimated using 
Generalised Least Squaresl8• The results of this estimation may be seen in Table 4.919, In 
addition to improving the efficiency of the estimates, the use of a Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression approach also allows the testing of restrictions across equations. For example, it 
is possible to test the hypothesis that the alpha terms are equal across countries, e.g. auk'! = 
abd,t' In other words, it is possible to test whether the basic required rate of return is the same 
across countries. 
Estimating the five equations using a Seemingly Unrelated Regression approach, the 
lowest constant term was that of the UK and the highest that of Japan. Generally, the 
significance of the constant terms was improved, with all the a terms being significant at the 
5% level, except the UK where still only a 10% level of significance was achieved. Whilst 
there is evidence to suggest a positive constant term for each country, there is very little 
evidence to suggest that the constant term differs across countries with only the difference 
15Since the data was serially, as well as contemporaneously, correlated, before carrying out the SUR 
analysis the data was transformed using a Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. 
16The reported errors are not robust errors as in previous tables due to the difficulties of incorporating 
robust errors into a SUR framework. However, on examination of the residuals from the SUR analysis, 
evidence of ARCH effects were only found in the cases of Germany and the US. 
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between Japan and the US being significant at the 5% level (see Table 4.10)20. The constant 
terms of the UK and Japan were significantly different but only at the 10% level which, 
interestingly, was also true of Germany and Japan. These results produce little evidence that 
"true" short-termism is prevalent in the UK where investors display, if anything, a lower basic 
required rate of return. The coefficient on the exchange rate risk premium was not significant 
for any ofthe five countries, thus providing no evidence to support the existence of "general" 
short-termism. Again the lack of support for an exchange rate risk premium suggests that the 
assumption of rational expectations in the foreign exchange market was valid. 
The results obtained by using ex ante real interest rates and ex ante exchange volatility, 
hence relaxing the assumption of rational expectations in the interest and foreign exchange 
markets, are presented in Table 4.1l.21 In contrast to the ex post results none of the constant 
terms is significant. There is, however, evidence to suggest the existence of an exchange rate 
risk premium in France where the coefficient on exchange rate volatility was significant at the. 
5% level. 
When comparing the ex post and ex ante UK data the basic rate of return, a, is much 
smaller with the ex ante data and is no longer significantly greater than zero (although the ex 
post result is only significant at the 10% level). The Japanese basic ex ante rate of return is 
smaller and also negative compared to its ex post counterpart, though neither differ 
significantly from zero. 
20 To test for the difference between constant terms TSP was used. 
21 Using the French dataset adding a second lag of the dependent variable resulted in a slight increase in 
autocorrelation with the significance level of the Q statistic being 0.018. 
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Table 4.9: Testing for Evidence of Short-Termism-
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results. 
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In terms of the exchange rate volatility variable. there is also little difference between the 
results produced by ex ante and ex post data. There is little evidence. therefore. that the 
rational expectation assumption made in the previous chapter was not a valid one to make. 
The French data do. however, produce a contrast between the ex ante and ex post results with 
the ex post basic return being higher and significantly different from zero. Using the ex ante 
data also produce a significant exchange rate volatility variable in contrast to the ex post data. 
Table 4.11: Tests for Evidence of Short-Term ism 
Ex Ante Real Interest Rates and Ex Ante Exchange Volatility 
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Y) SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Following the finding in Chapter 3 that if short-termism does exist it is in the form of 
"true" short-termism, the purpose of this chapter has been to provide further empirical 
investigation into "true" short-termism. In addition, by relaxing the rational expectations 
assumption made in the preceding chapter, a non-zero exchange rate risk premium was 
allowed to exist. The exchange rate risk premium is of interest to the issue of short-termism 
in that a higher exchange rate risk premium would lead, ceteris paribus, to a higher discount 
rate and would, therefore, constitute "general" short":'termism. 
The test for evidence of short-termism carried out in this chapter was based on the 
decomposition of the rate of return on Treasury bills into two components: a basic required 
rate of return and an exchange rate risk premium. The null hypothesis to be tested was that 
the basic rate of return required by investors did not differ across the sample of countries. If 
evidence of a higher rate of return was found, this would be taken as indicative of the presence 
of "true" short-termism. Similarly, any evidence ofa high exchange rate risk premium would 
be taken as being indicative of "general" short-termism. This test was carried out using firstly 
with ex post data and then repeated using ex ante data. 
U sing ex post data the basic rate of return for UK investors was lower than those in 
France and Japan but higher than Germany and the US. However, the basic rate of return was 
only significantly different from zero at the 5% level for the French data. The use of a 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression approach improved significance levels, showing that the 
lowest returns were in the UK and US with the highest in Japan, which is in direct contrast 
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to the short-termism arguments outlined i~ Chapter 2. The use of ex ante figures did result 
in a relatively higher constant term for the UK than the other countries, but none of the 
constant terms was found to be significantly different from zero. Therefore, these results 
produce little evidence to support the assertion that UK investors display "true" short-term ism. 
The similarity between the ex ante and ex post results suggests that the assumption of rational 
expectations appears to be valid except when the French data were used. 
There was very little evidence to suggest the presence of an exchange rate risk 
premium in any of the countries and no evidence to suggest the presence of such a premium 
in the UK, hence further casting doubt on the assertion that UK investors are short-termist. 
The lack of evidence to support a non-zero exchange risk premium suggests the assumption 
made in the previous chapter concerning the validity of rational expectations in the foreign 
exchange market is correct. 
Therefore the evidence presented in this chapter, supporting those produced in the 
previous chapter, suggests that UK investors are not short-termist in their investment 
behaviour either in terms of 'true' short-term ism or 'general' short-termism in the form of an 
exchange risk premium. As has been seen in ~hapter 2, however, short-termism covers a wide 
range of definitions of which just one has been used here. As a result, whilst no evidence has 
been found for short-termism in terms of the definitions and assumptions used in this analysis 
this does not rule out the presence of short-termism in other forms. In particular short-
termism is not ruled out in the form of the numerator effect i.e. the underestimation of future 
cash flows due to, for example, macroeconomic uncertainty. 
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APPENDIX 
Tests for Stationarity and Autore&ressiye Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
Tests for stationarity and Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity were carried 
out on all series to be used in the empirical work. Previous research has shown that the 
assumption of constant conditional variance of the error tenn is not always valid in time series 
models, particularly in finance models., therefore ARCH tests will be carried out on all the data 
to be used. The test for the presence of ARCH in a series will be carried out by using the 
following regression 
Y, .. a o + E, (AI) 
From this regression the squares of the fitted errors are obtained and regressed on the 
squared residuals from q previous time periods, under the null hypothesis that no ARCH 
effects are present. The presence of ARCH effects suggests the use of heteroscedastically 
consistent standard errors such as those produced by White's procedure. 
A second set of tests to be carried out were stationarity tests: in order for OLS 
estimation techniques to be valid the dependent and independent variables must be stationary 
with error tenns displaying a zero mean and finite variance (i.e. mean, variance and covariance 
should be constant over time). Dickey-Fuller (1981) tests are used to test for the presence of 
stationarity in each series. The procedure is carried out by considering the pth order 
autoregressive process 
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Yt = IXO + IX V't-l + IXaYt-2 + .,. + IXpVt-l"l + Et (A2) 
which can be "reparameterised" as 
This generalises to a higher order autoregressive process, therefore the AR(p) model 
may be reformulated as 
p 
aYt .. IXO + YY1_1 + 1:: P;4YI_t.1 + E.t 
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(A4) 
where nis large enough to ensure that Etis white noise, I1Yt= (Yt- Yt-J and y =(~aj- 1). The 
parameter of interest in equation (A4) is the coefficient on YI-I, Y. which is used as the test 
statistic. In the presence of a unit root ~ a i = 1 and thus Y =(~ a i-I) = 0 _ Therefore the value 
of y must be significantly different from zero to enable the null hypothesis of a unit root to 
be rejected. However. under the null of a unit root the t-distribution is no longer an 
appropriate and so alternative critical values are required. Such values were developed by 
Dickey and Fuller (1981) through Monte Carlo simulation methods. Rejection of the null 
hypothesis indicates that the series is 10• whilst if the null hypothesis cannot be rejected the 
series may be I). To test whether or not a series is I) the series should be considered in first 
differences 
(AS) 
The above tests however, are only valid under fairly restrictive assumptions: i.e. errors 
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are assumed to be both independent and to have constant variance. Whilst the number of lags 
in the tests above are chosen to eliminate serial correlation, the power of the tests may be 
reduced by the presence of moving average terms and also by heterogenously distributed 
disturbance terms (Perron, 1988). As a result, further tests for stationarity, PhilIips-Perron 
tests, were also carried out. In contrast to the Dickey Fuller tests, Phillips Perron tests do not 
assume independent and identically distributed errors allowing the disturbances to be weakly 
dependent and heterogeneously distributed. Consider the following regressions' 
(A6) 
(A7) 
where T = number of observations and Ut = disturbance term. While EUt = 0, the disturbance 
is not required to be serially uncorrelated or homogeneous. The statistics developed by 
PhiIlips (1987a, 1987b) and Phillips and Perron (1988) allow the testing of the following 
hypotheses about the coefficients ~: 
2). ( ao, ~. a1 ) = (0, 0, 1) 3). (~. a1 ) = (0,1). 
Where 1) is a transformation of the standard t-statistic and denoted Z(tt) while 2) and 3) are 
standard F-statistics denoted Z( <1>2) and Z( <1>3) respectively. Two further hypotheses, 
4). ai- = 1 and 5). (80*, a/) = (0,1) can also be tested using the Phillips-Perron transformations 
of the relevant t-statistic and F statistic denoted Z( t~ and Z( <I> I) respectively. The validity of 
the regression equation (A7) depends upon the drift term ao• being zero (Taylor, 1992, plO). 
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Therefore where there is no significant time trend the more powerful test statistics Z(t~ and 
Z( cl> I) will be estimated, otherwise the test will comprise of regression (A6) with test statistics 
Z(t,), Z(<I>2) and Z(<I>3)' 
Phillips-Perron tests have been used to overcome any weaknesses in the Dickey-Fuller 
tests in the presence of error terms which are not independent and identically distributed. 
However it should be noted that Phi1lips-Perron statistics may reject the null of a unit root too 
often in the presence of a first-order moving average process. Furthermore, tests for 
stationarity, whether Dicky-Fuller or Phillips-Perron, do not provide conclusive evidence on 
the time series properties of data. 
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Table AI: Augmented Dickey Fuller Statistics-Real Treasury Bill Rates 
Levels 
y 
UK -3.507* 
(2) 
Germany -2.291 
(0) 
Japan -2.821** 
(0) 
France -2.373 
(4) 
France -3.526* 
(with time trend) (3) 
us -1.782 
(12) 
Q(36) 
45.198 
(1.140) 
37.284 
(0.410) 
42.039 
(0.226) 
50.843 
(0.052) 
47.728 
(0.091) 
43.425 
(0.184) 
First Differences 
y. 
-10.764* 
(O) 
-13.053* 
(0) 
-17.488* 
(O) 
-7.288* 
(4) 
-6.597 
(11) 
Q(36) 
48.229 
(0.084) 
34.584 
(0.536) 
46.336 
(0.116) 
33.446 
(0.591) 
41.371 
(0.248) 
Notes: The equations tested for levels and first differences are equations A4 and A5 respectively. The tests were 
also run for all series including a time trend, where this time trend was found to be significant the results are 
reported. The null hypothesis is that the series contains a unit root i.e. y = O. The critical values for the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test are -2.87 and -2.5JOIo at the 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. * 
denotes significance at the 5% level and ** denotes significance at the 10% level. The figures in parentheses 
below the ADF statistics refer to the number of lags required to produce white noise residuals. Q is the Ljung-
Box statistic with the figures in parentheses below this statistic being the marginal significance levels. 
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Table A2: Augmented Dickey Fuller Statistics-Ex Ante Real Treasury Bill Rates 
Levels First Differences 
y Q(36) y. Q(36) 
UK -3.657* 46.990 -14.693* 49.136 
(1) (0.104) (0) (0.071) 
Germany -2.306 37.445 -12.926* 33.923 
(0) (0.403) (0) (0.568) 
Japan -2.693** 37.302 -17.306* 45.290 
(0) (0.409) (0) (0.138) 
France -2.210 49.253 -6.796* 34.390 
(4) (0.069) (4) (0.545) 
France -3.646* 45.992 
(With time trend) (3) (0.123) 
US -2.048 48.089 -7.574* 45.515 
(7) (0.086) (6) (0.133) 
Notes: see Table AI. 
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Table A3: Augmented Dickey Fuller Statistics-Ex Post Exchange Rate Volatility 
Levels First Differences 
y Q(36) y. Q(36) 
UK -10.012* 27.684 -17.002* 43.883 
(0) (0.838) (1) (0.172) 
Germany -12.207* 40.318 -10.637* 46.556 
(0) (0.285) (5) (0.112) 
Japan -9.880* 30.442 -16.369* 48.746 
(0) (0.730) (1) (0.076) 
Japan 
(With time trend) -10.168* 28.795 
(0) (0.798) 
France -4.084* 48.447 
-13.168* 29.886 
(7) (0.080) (7) (0.754) 
US -11.097* 39.357 -12.762* 47.949 
(0) (0.322) (3) (0.088) 
US -2.235 35.885 
(With time trend) (0) (0.474) 
Notes: see Table AI. 
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Table A4: Augmented Dickey Fuller Statistics-Ex Ante Exchange Rate Volatility 
Levels First Differences 
y Q(36) y. Q(36) 
UK -6.774* 30.695 -17.804* 42.073 
(0) (0.719) (0) (0.225) 
Japan -11.966* 22.731 -7.642* 44.221 
(0) (0.958) (1) (0.163) 
Japan -8.511* 33.955 
(With time trend) (1) (0.566) 
France -10.190* 26.350 -15.109* 49.403 
(0) (0.881) (1) (0.068) 
France -10.468* 28.495 
(With time trend) (0) (0.809) 
Notes: see Table AI. 
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Table AS: Phillips-Perron Statistics- Real Treasury Bill Rates 
Levels First Differences 
z(t,J Z(<I>l) Z(t,J Z(<I>l) 
UK -3.635a 7.021a -10.621 56.397 
Germany -3.005 4.659 -12.773 81.475 
Japan -2.236 2.502 -19.262 184.976 
France -1.855a 2.019a -12.993a 84.503a 
US -2.368a 2.87~ -10.086a 50.588a 
Notes: Z(t,J and Z( $,) are the Phillip-Perron test statistics. a denotes cases where autocorrelation is present. 
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Table A6: Phillips-Perron Statistics- Ex Ante Real Treasury Bill Rates 
Levels First Differences 
Z(t..) z(4)1) Z(t..) z(4)1) 
UK -4.022 8.457 -14.520 105.447 
Germany -3.024 4.764 -12.639 79.789 
Japan -2.887 4.411 -18.053 162.612 
France -2.0658 2.665& -15.046a 113.048a 
US -2.5038 3.1948 -17.0208 144.576a 
Notes: see Table A5. A significant time trend was found for the French series. The Phillips-Perron test 
statistics, Z" Z(4)2) and Z(4)3), were as follows -3.425, 4.314, 6.019 . .. 
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Table A7: Phillips-Perron Statistics- Ex Post Exchange Rate Volatility 
Levels First Differences 
Z(t...} z(4).) Z(t...) z(4).) 
UK -10.128 51.317 -27.214 367.831 
Germany -12.055 72.673 -38.3828 728.4308 
Japan -11.627 67.678 -34.901a 604.2228 
France -10.338 53.486 -29.691- 434.0314 
US -13.842 95.900 -56.958a 1614.2548 
Notes: A significant time trend was found in the US data The Phillips-Perron test statistics, Zu Z(~) and Z(4)3), 
were as follows -14.031, 6S.662, 98.494. 
Table A8: PhiHips-Perron Statistics- Ex Ante Exchange Rate Volatility 
Levels First Differences 
Z(t".) Z(4)z) Z(t...) Z(4)z) 
UK -6.818 23.258 -19.391 187.493 
Japan -7.763 38.973 -13.46~ 90.9158 
France -10.102 51.029 -31.203 483.878 
Notes: see Table AS. A significant time trend was found in the first differences series for Japan. The PhiIlips-
Perron test statistics, Z" Z(4)2) and Z(4)3)' were as follows -14.0S6, 6S.986, 98.976 
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Table A9: Testing Cor ARCH eCCects: Ex Post Real Interest Rates 
ARCH UK Germany Japan France US 
order 
1 223.690* 209.549* 196.939* 213.273* 159.642* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2 225.801* 207.672* 196.838* 211.519* 172.329* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
3 224.479* 204.931* 196.012* 210.050* 175.173* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
4 222.279* 202.301 * 195.757* 208.247* 174.699* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are marginal significance levels, * denotes significance at the 5% level. 
Table AIO: Testing Cor ARCH efCects- Ex Ante Real Interest Rates 
ARCH UK Germany Japan France US 
order 
1 212.610* 205.745* 207.762* 208.812* 129.826* 
, (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2 211.407* 203.706* 207.898* 206.934* 131.841* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
3 207.712* 200.907* 209.490* 205.421* 132.692* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
4 205.636* 198.247* 209.337* 203.648* 132.283* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: see Table A9. 
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Table All: Testing for ARCH effects- Ex Ante Exchange Rate Volatility 
ARCH UK Japan France 
order 
1 21.056* 236.851* 5.118* 
(0.446E-05) (0.000) (0.024) 
2 22.172* 235.828* 8.095* 
(0. 153E-04) (0.000) (0.017) 
3 22.119* 234.803* 8.970* 
(0.616E-04) (0.000) (0.030) 
4 33.426* 233.769* 9.206 
(0.098E-05) (0.000) (0.056) 
Notes: see Table A9. 
Table A12: Testing for ARCH effects- Ex Post Exchange Rate Volatility DOE 
ARCH UK Germany Japan France US 
order 
1 18.391* 0.092 5.682* 0.568E-02 0.166 
(0. 180E-04) (0.762) (0.017) (0.940) (0.684) 
2 22.104* 0.265 6.187* 0.710E-02 0.177 
(0. 159E-04) (0.876) (0.045) (0.996) (0.915) 
3 22.351* 0.455 6.539 0.021 0.210 
(0.551E-04) (0.929) (0.088) (0.999) (0.976) 
4 22.323* 0.633 7.202 0.067 0.233 
(0. 173E-03) (0.959) (0.126) (0.999) (0.994) 
Notes: see Table A9. 
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RESULTS 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test results for all countries are reported in 
Tables A1-A4. The ex post real interest rate series are considered first where, in levels, the 
null hypothesis that the series contains a unit root can be rejected for the UK at a 5% level of 
significance and for Japan at a 10% level of significance. This is not true however of the 
German and US data. A significant time trend was found in the French data and when the 
ADF tests are carried out including this time trend it became possible to reject the presence 
ofa unit root. Tests using first differences all reject a unit root. The Phillips-Perron tests for 
the ex post real interest rate series are reported in Table AS. These results support those 
obtained by the ADF tests for the UK and US. In contrast to the ADF results, however, the 
hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected in the German series in levels, whilst such a 
hypothesis can no longer be rejected for France or Japan. In first differences the null 
hypothesis can be rejected for all countries. 
The Augmented Dickey Fuller tests on the ex ante real interest rates produce the 
similar results when considering levels to those obtained using the ex post series. When the 
PhiIIips-Perron tests are used a unit root can be rejected at the 5% level for UK, Germany and 
Japan. The French data allows the rejection of a unit root when a time trend is included. 
Whilst the US data cannot reject the null hypothesis the significance of the test only just fails 
to reach the 10% level. The ADF tests of the ex post exchange rate volatility series l:i.llow the 
rejection of a unit root in levels for all series except the US. This was also true of the series 
in first differences. The PhiIlips-Perron tests replicated these results except that the US data 
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was found to reject a unit root in contrast to the ADF results. All the ex ante exchange rate 
volatility series rejected the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5% level both in levels and 
first differences. These results were produced by both the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and the 
Phillips-Perron tests. In summary, the evidence presented here suggests that exchange rate 
data is stationary whilst there is evidence that some of the interest rate series may be non-
stationary most notably those of the US. 
The results of the tests for Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity are reported 
in Tables A9-A12 and indicate the presence of heteroscedastic error terms in many of the 
series. All the interest rate series, ex ante and ex post, displayed highly significant ARCH 
effects. The ex ante series on exchange rate volatility also displayed ARCH effects, whilst in 
the ex post (Bank of England) series ARCH effects were only found in the UK and Japanese 
series (up to ARCH order 2). As has already been seen in Table 4.6 ARCH effects were found 
in the Datastream exchange rate series in UK, Japan and France. 
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CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The concern over the possible existence of short -termism has arisen out of the 
relatively poor economic performance of the UK compared to its major competitors. It has 
been widely argued that this poor performance has been the result of investors' behaviour 
and in particular myopic attitudes leading to relatively low long-term investment. The aim 
of this thesis has been to carry out an empirical investigation into some UK evidence on 
short-termism. A parallel hypothesis to be considered was whether international 
differences in investor behaviour, where they exist, follow a pattern. Of particular interest 
was whether a distinction could be made between behaviour of investors in countries with 
capital-market-based financial systems and those with bank-based financial systems. 
The starting point of the thesis was to draw together the existing work on short-
termism which has so far covered a diverse area. Chapter 2 examines and categorises 
some of the existing work on short-termism. The various approaches to short-term ism are 
categorised into those which result in the denominator of the present value equation being 
too high and those which result in the numerator being too low, referred to as the 
denominator effect and the numerator effect respectively. The result of both these effects 
is to reduce the present value of a proposed project thus causing the project to be rejected 
when it might otherwise have been accepted. 
The assertion that short-termism exists in equity markets relies on two factors: 
firstly that shareholders focus on the short-term performance of the company and secondly 
that they have the ability to constrain the managers' behaviour. Several theories were put 
forward as to why shareholders may focus on the short-term. The first group of these 
theories was built upon the existence of asymmetric information whereby shareholders do 
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not have the same level of information about the firm as that available to the managers. 
In order to assess the firm, therefore, shareholders have to use those instruments available 
to them such as current earnings and dividend payments, necessarily leading to a focus on 
the short-term. Such behaviour by investors need not be irrational but may simply be a 
rational response to market conditions. Proponents of the view that short-termism occurs 
due to the presence of asymmetric information call for improved information flows in 
capital markets. 
A second approach to short-termism involves imperfect knowledge. Here a game-
theoretic approach is used in which the players are managers and shareholders. The 
managers can either reward themselves now, or invest now and reward themselves at a 
future date. Shareholders face a similar choice of either accepting higher dividends now, 
or accepting lower dividends now in anticipation of receiving higher dividends in the 
future resulting from current investment. The difficulty arises in that neither side knows 
how the other will behave, leading to moral hazard problems. In this context managerial 
incentive schemes become important and any measures which produce cooperation 
between managers and shareholders help to alleviate moral hazard problems. Other 
potential causes of short-term ism in equity markets are speculative activity, the existence 
of institutional investors and takeover activity. The presence of these factors may also 
compound the problems of asymmetric information and moral hazard. There are, 
therefore, many explanations as to why shareholders might pursue short-term gains but in 
order for these to be translated into short-termism there needs to some mechanism for 
corporate control. 
Short-termism, it has been argued, may also arise through the banking system. The 
UK banking system has typically been compared and contrasted to systems elsewhere, 
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particularly those of Germany and Japan. The nature of the German and Japanese banking 
systems allows the development of closer links between banks and industry through 
characteristics such as universal banking, the exchange of staff, ownership of shares and 
the establishment of industrial groups. The close relationship between banks and industry 
leads to improved information flows, which, in turn, improves the accuracy with which the 
present value of a project can be calculated. This reduces the risk premium and therefore 
the discount rate. In contrast, the UK banking system has resulted in a more distant 
relationship leading to asymmetric information and moral hazard problems. 
The managers themselves may display short-term attitudes through remuneration 
schemes, the anticipated time horizon within the present job/ company, project appraisal 
and intra-firm relationships. In terms of managerial performance UK and US firms use 
short-term indicators, such as accounting profit, whereas in Japan bonus schemes 
emphasise long-term performance. Of particular concern in the UK has been the extent 
to which the payback method of investment appraisal is still used. The presence of these 
factors can lead to an emphasis on the short-term by managers, i.e. managers use a higher 
discount rate. 
A final area which has been considered as a cause of short-term behaviour in the 
UK is the economic environment. The stable economic environment of Germany and 
Japan has been contrasted with the unstable and unpredictable UK economy. The presence 
of economic volatility makes the prediction of future cash flows, and therefore the 
calculation of the present value of an investment project, difficult. The uncertainty may 
lead to a numerator effect since managers may err on the cautious side when forming 
expectations of future cash flows. 
In addition to categorising the existing theories, the aim of Chapter 2 was to 
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develop a more exact definition of short-termism, with particular emphasis being put on 
the development of a definition which could be used as a basis for empirical investigation. 
The various approaches to short-termism were drawn together to define short-termism as 
a situation in which the value of long-term returns is underestimated either through the 
underestimation of future cash flows (numerator effect) or the use of a high discount rate 
given the level of risk involved (denominator effect). Whilst Chapter 2 identifies a number 
of possible explanations to account for the .existence of short-termism this thesis has 
sought to concentrate only on one aspect; that short-termism may be identified by the use 
of a high discount rate, i.e. the existence of a denominator effect. The reasons for 
choosing such an approach were two-fold: firstly, whilst the numerator effect provides a 
.. 
valid explanation of short-termism, it remains unclear as to why such an effect should 
arise, and secondly, the numerator effect involves a practical difficulty in identifying 
whether or not cash flows are unduly pessimistic. In contrast, there are many explanations 
as to why the denominator effect should exist and it constitutes a more directly testable 
hypothesis through international comparisons. 
The purpose of Chapter 3 was to provide a preliminary investigation into the 
presence of short-termism in UK capital markets. The basic hypothesis to be tested was 
whether the rate of return received by UK investors is higher than those experienced in 
four other countries: Germany, Japan, France and the US. A key contribution of this 
chapter was the decomposition of the discount rate into various individual components and 
to consider the issue of short-termism in relation to each component. The discount rate 
was decomposed into the following elements: the time value of money; an inflation 
adjustment; a liquidity premium; an equity risk premium and an exchange rate risk 
premIum. Which of these components are relevant depends on the type of asset under 
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consideration. The analysis concentrates on three forms of fmance, Treasury bills, 
government bonds and equities, utilising their differing features to calculate the time value 
of money, the liquidity premium and the equity risk premium. The breakdown of the 
discount rate into individual components enables a distinction to be drawn between two 
different types of short-term ism: "true" and "general" short-term ism. "True" short-termism 
refers to a high time value of money and "general" short-termism to the use of a high 
discount rate for whatever reason, whether it be a high time value of money, liquidity 
premium or equity risk premium. The use of international comparisons also facilitates the 
consideration of a second hypothesis regarding the influence of differing fmancial systems 
on economic performance. 
The chapter considers three tests for the presence ot'short-termism looking for both 
"true" and "general" short-termism. The first test concentrates on "true" short-termism 
looking at the time value of money across countries by comparing international Treasury 
bill rates (or equivalent rates). The aim was to test whether investors in the UK have a 
higher time value of money than investors elsewhere. It was assumed in this chapter that 
rational expectations hold in both the interest rate and foreign exchange markets such that 
ex post and ex ante figures only differ by a random error. The implication of this 
assumption is that ex post interest rates may be used in the analysis to measure investors' 
required rate of return and also implies a zero exchange rate risk premium. An 
examination of the real rates of return found mean real returns relatively low in the UK 
and relatively high in Germany. In contrast to the arguments put forward in Chapters 1 and 
2, which suggest that the UK and US financial markets may typically be associated with 
short-term ism, these countries appear to have lower rates of return than elsewhere. 
Evidence to support the assertion that UK, and French, investors display short-term 
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behaviour was found, however, over the period 1985 to June 1995. Over this later period 
the US did not see a similar rise in real rates of return. Therefore, whilst there is little 
evidence to suggest UK investors are short-tennist over the period 1975 to 1995, there is 
evidence to suggest that UK investors are short-termist over the sub-period 1985 to 1995. 
Since any short-term tendencies that are present do not prevail over the longer period 1975 
to 1995, it is not possible to say that UK investors consistently behave in a short-term 
manner, i.e. it is not true to say that they are inherently short-tennist. This is an important 
result in terms of policy as the changes in investor behaviour may then be associated with 
market features or prevailing economic conditions; 
One possible explanation for the pattern of real rates of return involving economic 
conditions was put forward as the incorrect anticipation of inflation. The low real rates 
of return in the UK during the 1970s may have occurred as a result of investors 
underestimating the extremely high inflation rates of that period. Having experienced such 
high inflation in the 1970s, the high real rates of return seen in the 1980s could in turn 
have been the result of the overestimation by investors of future inflation rates. Comparing 
the UK real rates of return to those of the US lends support to this theory. The US, in 
contrast to the UK, did not experience such high inflation during the 1970s. Consequently 
there was less overestimation by US investors of future inflation rates, resulting in a less 
severe increase in real interest rates during the 1980s. 
Of key interest in this thesis has been how investors behave over the longer term 
and consequently the rate of return on a long-tenn government (risk-free) asset is 
important. The lowest mean return on long-term government bonds was found in UK with 
the highest being in Germany. The UK mean real rate of return was only significantly 
lower than those of France and Germany. These results further question the hypothesis 
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that UK investors are short-termist with, in contrast to the arguments outlined in Chapter 
2, no significant difference between the mean returns ofUK and Japan. When the sub-
period 1985 to June 1995 was considered the UK mean real return increased relative to 
those elsewhere, only now being significantly lower than France and significantly higher 
than Japan. The return on long-term government bonds was then used to calculate a 
liquidity premium to show the reward investors require for investing over the long-term 
rather than the short-term. The liquidity premium is of interest to the issue of short-
termism as it constitutes one of the components of the discount rate and so a high liquidity 
premium would constitute "general" short-tennism. The results from this calculation 
showed that the real liquidity premium required by UK investors was on average lower 
than elsewhere whilst there was little difference in the nominal liquidity premium across 
countries. These results provide no evidence that there is a relatively high liquidity 
premium in the UK and consequently no evidence that "general" short-termism is present 
among UK investors. 
The third test to be carried out used equity return data to consider both equity 
returns and the equity risk premium. The equity risk premium has been described as the 
rate ofretum investors expect to obtain from an equity investment in excess of that which 
they would expect from a risk-free asset. The equity risk premium is of interest as it can 
affect the discount rate and so, like the liquidity premium, may contribute to "general" 
short-termism. The highest mean rate of return on equity was found in UK and the lowest 
in Japan, however these differences were not found to be significant at the 5% level. 
Similar results were obtained when considering the real and nominal equity risk premiums. 
A mean price of risk, defined as the return to an asset over a given period divided by the 
standard deviation in returns to that asset over the period, was also calculated and 
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produced similar results. Therefore, as with the tests involving the liquidity premium 
those carried out using the equity risk premium do not suggest that "general" short-termism 
is present in the UK. 
In addition to considering whether or not short-termism exists in amongst UK 
investors, this thesis has also considered whether or not any differences in investor 
behaviour which do exist may be associated with the type of financial systems which 
prevails in a particular country, i.e. whether it is capital-market-based,or bank-based. 
Using Treasury bills and long-term government bonds it was not possible to group the 
countries according to financial systems. That is, it was not possible to group the countries 
according to bank-based and capital-market-based financial systems except that the 
capital-market-based group did show a greater deviation 'in Treasury bill returns. The 
liquidity premium was in general lower for countries associated with capital-market-based 
financial systems. The equity risk premium was higher for the capital-market-based 
countries ofthe US and UK than the bank-based Japan and Germany, there was however 
little evidence to suggest these differences were significant. 
Following the results of Chapter 3 which suggest if short-termism does exist it is 
in the form of "true" short-term ism rather than "general" short-termism, Chapter 4 seeks 
to provide further empirical investigation into "true" short-termism. This was achieved by 
extending the analysis of Chapter 3 such that rational expectations were no longer 
assumed. The relaxation of this assumption allows an exchange rate risk premium to exist 
and also no longer assumes that ex ante and ex post interest rates differ only by a random 
error. The chapter therefore includes the derivation of ex ante real interest rates and an ex 
ante exchange rate volatility variable. 
To further examine the issue of short-termism, the Treasury bill returns were 
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broken down as follows: a basic required rate of rettun, IX, an exchange rate risk premium, 
X, and a residual term E. The null hypothesis was that the basic rate of return required by 
investors should be the same for each country and any departures from this may be 
interpreted as behavioural differences on the part of investors and, in particular, a higher 
IX may be interpreted as evidence of "true" short-termism. Also of interest is the exchange 
rate risk premium which, like the liquidity and equity risk premia, is a form of "general" 
short-termism. The testing ofthis hypothesis was carried out in terms of both ex ante and 
ex post data. 
Using ex post data the constant term was found to be positive and significant at the 
5% level for France and the US and at the 10% level for Germany and the UK. The 
closeness between the constant terms was noted and, in particular, the closeness between 
the constant terms of Germany and the UK. The lowest returns were to US and German 
investors whilst the highest were to French investors. From these results, therefore, it can 
be seen that the basic rate of return received by UK investors was not high relative to the 
other countries in the sample. The exchange rate risk premium was not found to be 
significant for any of the countries studied. Given that no evidence of relatively high basic 
rates of return or an exchange rate risk premium was found, these results suggest that UK 
investors do not display either "true" or "general" short-term behaviour relative to the 
other countries in the sample. Re-running the regressions using a Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression approach resulted in all the IX terms being significant at the 5% level except 
that of the UK which was significant at the 10% level. The basic return to UK investors 
was the lowest and Japanese investors the highest. There was evidence of a positive 
constant term in all countries but no evidence to suggest that the constant term differs 
- across countries with only the difference between Japan and the US being significant at 
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the 5% level. There was a significant difference however at the 10% level between Japan 
and the UK, and between Japan and Germany. Therefore there is again little evidence to 
support the hypothesis that short-tennism exists in the UK with UK investors. if anything. 
displaying a lower. rather than higher. basic rate of return. The exchange rate risk 
premium was not significant so suggesting that "general" short-termism does not exist. Ex 
ante data were also used to test the hypothesis that UK investors displayed short-term 
behaviour. Using ex ante data allowed the relaxation of the rational expectations 
assumption in the interest rate market. In contrast to the ex post data none of the constant 
terms were found to be significantly different from zero, so little could be drawn from 
these results. The key point to note, however. is that the basic rate of return received by 
UK investors is not higher than elsewhere. Generally, there was little difference in the 
results produced by ex post and ex ante data, therefore supporting the validity of the 
rational expectations assumptions made in the previous chapter. The French ex ante data 
did however produce different results from the ex post results suggesting that such an 
assumption was not valid. The French ex ante data produced a higher and significant « 
term and also a significant exchange rate risk premium in contrast to the French ex post 
data. 
In summary, there is little evidence within the framework employed here to suggest. 
that UK .investors behave in a short-term manner. If short-termism does exist in the lJ:K 
the analysis in this thesis suggests that it is in the form of "true" short-termism and was 
present over the period 1985 to 1995. There was, however. no evidence to support the 
hypothesis that "general" short-termism exists in the UK with the liquidity, equity risk and 
exchange rate risk premia being relatively no higher than in the other countries studied . 
. There was also very little evidence to support the assertion that the capital-market-based 
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financial systems of the UK and the US result in more short-term investor behaviour than 
the bank-based financial systems of Germany and Japan. 
Several notes need to be made about the findings of this thesis, firstly, no attempt 
has been made to distinguish between rational and irrational behaviour. Of key importance 
to this study is whether or not OK firms face a higher required rate of return than its major 
competitors. The impact on the firms investment will be the same whether the behaviour 
can be described as rational or irrational. Secondly, whilst there is no evidence of short-
termism provided by the analysis of rates of return carried out in this thesis, this does not 
rule out short-term tendencies on the part of investors. Such tendencies may be eliminated 
through international arbitrage. Of key importance is the fact that the rate of return 
required by investors is not higher than elsewhere. As discussed in Chapter 1, much of the 
debate on short-termism links financial behaviour and economic performance, with 
myopic financial markets leading to underinvestment, particularly over the longer term. 
The lack of evidence to support the assertion that UK financial markets display short-term 
attitudes, at least in terms of the definition used here, suggests that other factors should be 
looked for to explain the UK's relatively poor economic performance. Finally, this thesis 
has only concentrated on only one of a number of forms of short-term ism, being based on 
a particular set of assumptions and data and does not preclude short-term ism existing in 
other forms. In particular, the results do not imply that a higher discount rate is not used 
by firms, but only suggest that it is not the investors who require a high discount rate to be 
used. 
Therefore. this thesis has provided some important contributions to the debate on 
short-termism. Firstly, it has developed a concise definition of short-termism which forms 
a more concrete basis for empirical work. Although many forms of short-termism have 
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been discussed, the work here has concentrated only on one strand of short-termism. This 
concentration has had the advantage of being able to consider and eliminate the possibility 
that short-termism exists in the form of a denominator effect according to the particular 
assumptions made. By showing there is limited evidence to support the existence of a 
denominator effect in UK capital markets according to these assumptions, this analysis 
indicates that if short-termism is present it is in some other form, thus providing direction 
for future research. Further, the decomposition of the discount rate into its components 
has two important benefits. Firstly, it becomes possible to identify more closely the 
particular aspect of investment appraisal which contributes to any short-term. attitudes 
which may exist. The ability to ascertain whether short-te.rm behaviour is the result of the 
time value of money of investors or the various risk premia· included in the discount rate, 
leads to the second benefit which is that a distinction may now be drawn between "true" 
and "general" short-termism. A final contribution of this thesis has been to link the role 
of the exchange rate risk premium in the international interest rate equality literature and 
the issue of short-termism. 
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